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Extraterritorial Rights in Border
Enforcement
Fatma E. Marouf*
Abstract
Recent shifts in border enforcement policies raise pressing
new questions about the extraterritorial reach of constitutional
rights. Policies that keep asylum seekers in Mexico, expand the
use of expedited removal, and encourage the cross-border use of
force require courts to determine whether noncitizens who are
physically outside the United States, or who are treated for legal
purposes as being outside even if they have entered the country,
can claim constitutional protections. This Article examines a
small, but growing body of cases addressing these
extraterritoriality issues in the border enforcement context,
focusing on disparities in judicial analyses that have resulted in
at least two circuit splits. Specifically, the Article explores
differences in courts’ selection and application of the Supreme
Court’s main extraterritoriality tests; various ways of
conceptualizing the interaction between the Court’s
extraterritoriality jurisprudence and the plenary power doctrine,
which one appellate court described as “competing”
constitutional fields; and contrasting approaches to the role of
separation of powers as a limiting structural principle, given the
ambiguity of the Constitution’s text regarding its geographic
scope. The separation of powers analysis reflects particular
concern about the Executive Branch’s manipulation of the border
as a legal construct, as well as its manipulation of national
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law (JD, MPH,
Harvard; BA, Yale). I would like to thank Cori Alonso-Yoder, Reena Parikh,
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security as an illusory threat, in order to evade accountability.
The Article concludes that extending constitutional protections,
preserving judicial review, and critically examining demands for
deference are crucial in this context in order to avoid creating a
law-free zone just beyond our southern border.
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I. Introduction
Countries around the world, following the United States’
lead, are increasingly applying their laws extraterritorially to
foreign nationals abroad in order to address transnational
problems.1 This trend cuts across numerous areas of domestic
statutory law.2 When it comes to applying the Constitution to
noncitizens abroad, however, there is no clear trend.3 The
1. See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from
Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 818–20, 844–56 (2009) (describing
the rise of domestic and global extraterritoriality and arguing that this trend
threatens sovereignty more than traditional sources of international law).
2. See id. at 848–49 (mentioning numerous areas of law where
extraterritorial application of United States law is on the rise, including, but
not limited to, antitrust, securities, intellectual property, criminal,
environmental, civil rights, and labor law).
3. See José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in
the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE L.J.
1660, 1660 (2009) (explaining that even after two centuries of courts
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Supreme Court has taken a case-by-case approach that defies
generalization.4 Over the past century, in contexts ranging from
“continental
expansion,
colonial
administration,
and
conventional war” to the unconventional “war on terror,” the
Court has utilized a variety of approaches to analyzing
constitutional extraterritoriality questions, leaving lower courts
with a complex patchwork of cases to try to apply to new
situations.5
Scholars have offered several possible theoretical
justifications for extending constitutional protections to
noncitizens abroad, including theories based on universalism,
membership, mutuality of obligations, and “global due process.”6
To date, however, the Court has not adopted a clear normative
framework for analyzing the Constitution’s extraterritorial
reach.7 Commentators have also debated whether the
Constitution’s structural restraints on government (e.g.
separation of power principles) apply globally, even if individual
rights do not, and disputed whether distinctions can actually be
drawn between “negative” and “positive” constitutional rights.8
While some of the Court’s precedents implicitly indicate that

considering whether the Constitution has extraterritorial force the law
“remains unsettled, and no framework for analyzing these claims is clearly
defined, much less well established”).
4. See infra Part III.
5. See Cabranes, supra note 3, at 1664 (describing the approach taken
by courts as “context-specific, tailored to the needs of the case, and sensitive
to the practical limitations of enforcing a particular rule”).
6. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909,
916–20 (1991) (discussing universalist approaches, membership models, strict
territoriality approaches, and global due process); Christina Duffy Burnett,
Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 797, 797 (2005) (suggesting that the set of Supreme Court decisions
known collectively as the Insular Cases installed a “doctrine of territorial
deannexation in American constitutional jurisprudence”); see generally
GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
7. See Cabranes, supra note 3, at 1664 (“Instead [of using a clear
framework,] the approach taken by [U.S.] courts, when confronted with
requests to apply the Constitution to actions abroad (that is,
‘extraterritorially’), is context-specific, tailored to the needs of the case, and
sensitive to the practical limitations of enforcing a particular rule.”).
8. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and
the Constitution Abroad, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1651–62 (2013) (discussing the
theoretical justifications for distinguishing individual rights and separation of
powers and arguing that the distinction is ultimately unconvincing).
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structural limitations apply extraterritorially, it has never
stated so explicitly, further adding to the confusion.9
This Article focuses on an emerging body of
extraterritoriality cases involving U.S.-Mexico border
enforcement being decided against this complex legal backdrop.
Recent shifts in border enforcement policies and practices raise
pressing new questions about the extraterritorial reach of
constitutional rights.10 Under the Trump Administration, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which is part of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has adopted policies
that (1) require asylum seekers to wait in Mexico for weeks or
months before having an opportunity to apply for asylum;11 (2)
force asylum seekers to return to Mexico while they are waiting
for their court dates;12 and (3) aggressively use the expedited
removal process, which treats individuals in the interior of the
country as if they were at the border.13 Additionally, Border
Patrol agents standing on United States soil have engaged in
violent acts that harm individuals on the other side of the
border, such as cross-border shootings14 and the use of tear gas
on migrants.15 A critical legal question that arises in all of these
9. See id. at 1644 (explaining how the Court has assumed that basic
structural limitations generally apply extraterritorially).
10. See, e.g., Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1220
(S.D. Cal. 2019) (involving the organization Al Otro Lado and a group of
individual asylum seekers challenging “metering” and related activities,
which they describe as an illegal “Turnback Policy”).
11. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SPECIAL
REVIEW—INITIAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING FAMILY SEPARATION ISSUES UNDER
THE ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY 5–6 (2018), https://perma.cc/HNU9-2J2P (PDF)
[hereinafter OIG SPECIAL REVIEW] (explaining the “metering” policy).
12. Press Release, Migrant Prot. Protocols, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(Jan. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q26N-J4PA (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) [hereinafter MPP Press
Release].
13. Notice Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg.
35,409 (July 23, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 Designation].
14. See, e.g., Hernández v. Mesa (Hernández II), 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir.
2018) (en banc); Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018).
15. See Jamil Dakwar, Government Use of Tear Gas is Illegal in War. It
Should be Illegal Here, Too., ACLU (Nov. 28, 2018, 5:45 PM),
https://perma.cc/6RX8-CH29 (last updated Jan. 2, 2018) (last visited Jan. 5,
2020) (describing domestic lawsuits filed by the ACLU challenging the use of
tear gas) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

756

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751 (2020)

situations is whether someone who is physically outside the
United States, or who is legally treated as being outside the
United States under immigration law, can invoke constitutional
protections in United States courts.16
Immigration policies pose a particularly tricky context for
analyzing constitutional extraterritoriality issues because of
their intersection with the political branches’ plenary power
over immigration, which limits judicial review of immigration
decisions.17 In fact, the Third Circuit described plenary power
and extraterritoriality as “seemingly disparate, and perhaps
even competing, constitutional fields,” struggling to “discern the
manner in which . . . [they] interact.”18 One of the challenges in
analyzing the interaction of these fields is that plenary power
cases have traditionally treated physical presence in the United
States as a trigger for constitutional rights to apply,19 whereas
the Supreme Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence makes it
clear that constitutional rights do not depend on territoriality.20
This Article explores the extraterritorial reach of constitutional
rights in this complicated context of border enforcement.
Part II of the Article provides background information
about border enforcement policies and practices that raise
extraterritoriality issues. These include the policy of “metering”

16. See infra Part IV.
17. See, e.g., Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889)
(recognizing the political branches’ plenary authority to exclude aliens);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (“It is not within
the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never been
[naturalized, resided or admitted to the U.S.], shall be permitted to enter, in
opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the [L]egislative and
[E]xecutive [B]ranches of the national government.”); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (emphasizing that the power
to admit or exclude an alien is inherently held by the Executive and
Legislative Branches).
18. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 434 (3d Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017).
19. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (explaining the
Court’s practice of granting an alien seeking initial admission to the United
States “no constitutional rights regarding his application[,]” however, once an
alien is physically in the country “and begins to develop the ties that go with
permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly”).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–66
(1990) (framing a “sufficient connections” approach to be used to determine
individuals’ rights, as opposed to a strict territorial limit to constitutional
rights).
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asylum seekers at ports of entry;21 the “Remain in Mexico” policy
implemented under the so-called “Migration Protection
Protocols” that forces asylum seekers to return to Mexico;22 the
expedited removal policy, which was recently expanded to apply
throughout the entire United States;23 as well as policies and
practices regarding the cross-border use of force.24 This Part
explains how these policies and practices manipulate location in
a way that deprives noncitizens of legal protections and raise
challenging questions about what “extraterritoriality” means in
unconventional situations, such as when a significant part of the
action occurs in the United States.
In order to analyze these complex questions, Part III
explains the different approaches that the Supreme Court has
used to determine the extraterritorial reach of constitutional
rights. The two predominant approaches are the “substantial
connections” test set forth in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez,25 a case that involved a Fourth Amendment
challenge to an extraterritorial search and seizure in Mexico,26
and the “functional test” that the Supreme Court applied in
Boumediene v. Bush,27 which held that Guantánamo Bay
detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus.28 This
discussion also addresses the “fundamental rights” approach,
which was historically used to determine which constitutional
21. See OIG SPECIAL REVIEW, supra note 11, at 5–6 (explaining the
“metering” policy).
22. See MPP Press Release, supra note 12 (“The Migrant Protection
Protocols (MPP) are a U.S. Government action whereby certain foreign
individuals entering or seeking admission to the U.S. from Mexico—illegally
or without proper documentation—may be returned to Mexico and wait
outside of the U.S. for the duration of their immigration proceedings . . . .”).
23. See 2019 Designation, supra note 13, at 35,410 (designating new
categories of aliens for expedited removal, including those encountered in a
location more than 100 air miles from the border, and who have been
continuously present in the United States for less than two years).
24. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter
EO on Border Security].
25. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
26. See id. at 271–73 (explaining the substantial connections approach to
the reach of individuals’ constitutional protections).
27. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
28. See id. at 764–65 (explaining the functional approach to the reach of
individuals’ constitutional protections).
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rights should apply to unincorporated United States territories
after the Spanish-American War, and continues to implicitly
influence decisions, including Boumediene.29 All of these
approaches reject strict territoriality as a requirement for
constitutional protections, turning on consideration of other
factors. Part III then juxtaposes these approaches with plenary
power cases that rely on territoriality as a trigger for
constitutional rights, and examines exceptions to territoriality
under the plenary power doctrine, raising questions about how
these doctrines interact.
Probing these issues further, Part IV examines several
recent appellate and district court decisions that have
addressed constitutional claims and extraterritoriality issues in
the border enforcement context. These decisions involve
constitutional challenges to cross-border shootings and
expedited removal orders, both of which resulted in circuit
splits, as well as a due process challenge to “metering” asylum
seekers that is still being litigated in district court at the time
of this writing. These decisions highlight significant disparities
regarding the courts’ use of extraterritoriality tests, the role of
the plenary power doctrine, and the relevance of separations of
powers concerns, which help explain the circuit splits.
Part V examines the discrepancies among these border
enforcement cases in greater detail. The first section of Part V
analyzes differences in the selection of extraterritoriality tests,
as well as variations in how specific tests are applied. It also
explores how implicit and explicit analyses of a right’s
fundamental nature influenced the courts and contributed to
the circuit splits. This section concludes with a proposal for a
composite test that draws on Verdugo, Boumediene, and a
fundamental rights approach.
The second section of Part V identifies three different
approaches to the plenary power doctrine that emerge from the
cases. These involve applying the plenary power doctrine as a
trump card; an implicit deference doctrine; or a doctrine subject
to legislative constraints.
The last section of Part V examines the relevance of
separation of powers as a principle that guided the courts’
decisions. It explains the constitution’s textual ambiguity on
extraterritoriality issues and the need for structural principles,
29.

See infra Part III.A.3.
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such as separation of powers, to act as a check on executive
power. Since Boumediene presented separation of powers as an
anti-manipulation principle, this Part explores two specific
types of manipulation concerns that emerge from the cases:
manipulation of the border as a legal construct and
manipulation of national security as an illusory threat.
The Article concludes that extending constitutional
protections, preserving judicial review, and critically examining
demands for deference are crucial in this context in order to
avoid creating a law-free zone just beyond our southern border.
II. Extraterritoriality Issues in Border Enforcement
Shortly after Trump was elected President, he issued an
Executive Order titled “Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement Improvements” that announced several policy
changes, including expanding expedited removal and returning
asylum seekers from contiguous countries to the country from
which they approached the United States during removal
proceedings.30 These proposals immediately raised due process
concerns.31 Over the past couple of years, several of Trump’s
30. See EO on Border Security, supra note 24 at 8793 (articulating a
policy of expediting “determinations of apprehended individuals’ claims of
eligibility to remain in the United States”). A month after the Executive Order
was issued, the Department of Homeland Security issued a memorandum
clarifying certain vague aspects of the Executive Order. See Memorandum
from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Implementing the President’s
Border Sec. and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies (Feb. 20,
2017), https://perma.cc/NXP4-8HE4 (PDF) (enumerating the expedited
removal process and implementing the return process).
31. See, e.g., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER
“BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS” 1 (2017),
https://perma.cc/8L6A-UQUS (PDF) (“Overall, the provisions in the
[executive] order pose serious concerns for the protection and due process
rights of those currently residing in the United States, communities along the
U.S-Mexico border, and vulnerable populations seeking protection in the
country.”); Increased Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Executive
Order and DHS Memo: Frequently Asked Questions, CATHOLIC LEGAL
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/SG3T-6TXK (last
visited Dec. 23, 2019) (“If these directives succeed, detention will be expanded,
deportations accelerated at the expense of due process, and criminal penalties
for immigration offenses increased.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF
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proposed border enforcement policies have been implemented.32
This Part explains the policies with extraterritorial
implications, including those that keep asylum seekers in
Mexico, expand expedited removal, and encourage cross-border
uses of force.
A. Policies to Keep Asylum Seekers in Mexico
The Trump Administration has implemented multiple
policies designed to keep asylum seekers outside the United
States. One of these is “metering,” which requires asylum
seekers to wait in Mexico for weeks or months before having an
opportunity to apply.33 Another is called “Remain in Mexico,”
and forces non-Mexican asylum seekers to return to Mexico
after passing a credible fear interview and being placed in
removal proceedings.34
1. “Metering” Asylum Seekers at Ports of Entry
“Metering” refers to the practice of requiring asylum
seekers to wait along the border in Mexico before they can apply
for asylum in the United States.35 A version of metering dates
back to 2016, when the Obama Administration began using it to
regulate the flow of individuals at certain ports of entry, but its

EXECUTIVE ORDER “BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
IMPROVEMENTS,” 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/L4BJ-FFZQ (PDF) (“[V]ulnerable
people will almost certainly be sent back to dangerous, possibly
life-threatening circumstances, without the opportunity to seek legal
protection consistent with due process.”).
32. See, e.g., MPP Press Release, supra note 12 (detailing the Migrant
Protection Protocols which involve asylum seekers returning to Mexico while
they await their court date); 2019 Designation, supra note 13 (detailing the
use of an expedited removal process that treats individuals in the interior of
the country as if they were at the border).
33. See OIG SPECIAL REVIEW, supra note 11, at 5–6 (explaining that once
the processing facilities at the port of entry are at capacity, asylum seekers
must wait outside the United States, often in Mexico, for an opening at the
facility to begin their processing).
34. See MPP Press Release, supra note 12 (detailing how the “Remain in
Mexico” policy changes will operate).
35. OIG SPECIAL REVIEW, supra note 11, at 5–6.
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use was very limited and not widely known.36 In Spring 2018,
the Trump Administration publicly announced the “metering”
process, suggesting that it was a way to deal with the legal
“loophole” of asylum.37
A September 2018 report by the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) described “metering” in more detail.38 OIG
explained that, when metering, CBP officers stand at the
international line in the middle of the “pedestrian footbridges
[that] link the United States and Mexico,” and only allow
noncitizens to cross the line if “space is available” to hold them
in the port of entry.39 When the ports are “full,” CBP officers
inform the asylum seekers that they will be allowed to enter
later, once there is “sufficient space and resources to process

36. See id. at 6 n.11 (explaining that CBP officials informed the OIG team
that CBP has used metering since 2016 to “address safety and health hazards
that resulted from overcrowding at ports of entry”); see also Facing Walls: USA
and Mexico’s Violations of the Rights of Asylum-Seekers, AMNESTY INT’L (June
15, 2017), https://perma.cc/XHH9-X7SC (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (stating
that CBP officials are illegally refusing entry to asylum-seekers at ports of
entry) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Richard Gonzalez,
Advocates Say Agents Are Unlawfully Turning Away Asylum Seekers at the
Border, NPR (July 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/G6U3-5FET (last visited Dec.
23, 2019) (emphasizing that the Trump Administration has imposed stricter
controls on the asylum process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Caitlin Dickerson & Miriam Jordan, ‘No Asylum Here’: Some Say
U.S. Border Agents Rejected Them, NY TIMES (May 3, 2017),
https://perma.cc/YZ2F-UGBK (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (“Customs agents
have increasingly turned away asylum seekers without so much as an
interview.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Aaron Nelsen,
U.S. Officials Sending Asylum Seekers Back to Mexico, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, https://perma.cc/32HX-Z9XR (last updated Dec. 16, 2019) (last
visited Dec. 23, 2019) (noting the massive influx of asylum seekers along the
Southwest border in 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. See Rebekah Entralgo, U.S. is Violating Human Rights, Lying About
How Asylum Seekers Are Treated at Border, Per New Report, THINK PROGRESS
(Oct. 11, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://perma.cc/JH4Y-S7NM (quoting Secretary of
Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen); see also U.S. Customs & Border
Protection, Statement from Commissioner Kevin McAleenan on Operations at
San Ysidro Port of Entry (Apr. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/28GQ-VEWN (last
visited Dec. 23, 2019) (“[I]ndividuals [without appropriate documentation]
may need to wait in Mexico as CBP officers work to process those already
within our facilities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
38. OIG SPECIAL REVIEW, supra note 11, at 5–6.
39. Id. at 6.
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them.”40 However, the OIG team “did not observe severe
overcrowding at the ports of entry [when] it visited.”41 In
private, DHS informed Congress that the real purpose of
metering was to deter asylum seekers, because “[t]he more we
process, the more will come.”42
The practice of “metering” has resulted in wait times that
range from two weeks to six months at various ports of entry.43
During that time, asylum seekers are placed on a “waitlist,” but
confusion, lack of transparency, and corruption plague the
process.44 At some ports of entry, asylum seekers themselves
have created a waitlist.45 At others, officials from the Mexican
National Migration Institute, Mexican security agents, or even
cartel members have become managers of waiting lists.46 A
study reported nearly 19,000 asylum seekers on waitlists in
May 2019.47 Corruption is rampant in this haphazard system,
40. Id.
41. Id. at 7.
42. See Letter from Representatives Jerrold Nadler, Bennie Thompson,
and Zoe Lofgren, U.S. House of Representatives, to Comm’r Kevin McAleenan,
U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Dec. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/F43F-Q8PB
(PDF) (citing a statement by Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Intelligence, Jed Murdock during a briefing about the decision to limit
processing to 100 asylum seekers per day at the San Ysidro Port of Entry).
43. ROBERT STRAUSS CTR. FOR INT’L SEC. & LAW AT THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT
AUSTIN & THE CTR. FOR U.S.-MEX. STUDIES AT THE UNIV. CAL. SAN DIEGO SCH.
OF GLOB. POLICY & STRATEGY, METERING UPDATE 2–3 (Feb. 2019) [hereinafter
METERING UPDATE], https://perma.cc/7TS2-2SGK (PDF).
44. See Elliot Spagat et al., For Thousands of Asylum Seekers, All They
Can Do is Wait, AP NEWS (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/PFZ8-K5JE (last
visited Dec. 23, 2019) (describing migrants being attacked by cartels, sold fake
waitlist wristbands, and facing extortion by corrupt officials) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. See id. (explaining how an asylum seeker from Venezuela, Darwin
Mora, currently manages a waitlist of 900 people on a whiteboard while he
waits in Mexico for his turn to attempt to seek asylum).
46. See id. (detailing how a migrant shelter in Juarez, Mexico, created a
waitlist system by writing numbers on asylum seekers’ arms in black ink); see
also HARVARD IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM, REQUEST FOR
THEMATIC HEARING (MEXICO) ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION OF ASYLUM
SEEKERS AT THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER SUBMITTED TO THE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (July 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/6UUEGXN9 (PDF).
47. METERING UPDATE, supra note 43, at 2; see also Savitri Arvey,
Thousands of Asylum-Seekers Left Waiting at the US-Mexico Border, PRI
(June 17, 2019, 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/VS8L-Q59M (last visited Dec. 23,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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as waitlist managers often take bribes or charge asylum seekers
money to call their numbers or place them on a separate
“expedited” list.48
While waiting in Mexico, asylum seekers face significant
dangers, including kidnapping, trafficking, physical and sexual
assaults, murders, threats, theft, and extortion.49 Being forced
to wait in Mexico also impedes their ability to obtain legal
information about the asylum process and find attorneys to
assist them.50 Additionally, the “metering” process can lead to
family separation if not all family members are allowed to enter
the United States at the same time.51
In 2017, the organization Al Otro Lado and other plaintiffs
filed a lawsuit challenging what they describe as an illegal
“Turnback Policy.”52 The lawsuit alleges not only the metering
practices described above, but deliberate attempts to prevent
asylum seekers from applying through tactics that include
threats, intimidation, coercion, and verbal as well as physical

48. See Spagat, supra note 44 (“There are frequent allegations that
Mexican government officials or security agents demand bribes to let people
join the list or move up the list.”); see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, BARRED AT THE
BORDER: WAIT “LISTS” LEAVE ASYLUM SEEKERS IN PERIL AT TEXAS PORTS OF
ENTRY 7 (Apr. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/2FKU-KLQ9 (PDF) (reporting
allegations in multiple cities where private individuals, acting on behalf of the
municipality, extorted funds from asylum seekers to join “expedited” lists).
49. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 48, at 2; HEIDI ALTMAN, SYSTEMIC
RIGHTS ABUSES ON THE BORDER: THE REAL PROBLEMS AND WHAT WILL FIX THEM
1 (July 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/625K-UJK6 (PDF).
50. See Lorelei Laird, Strangers in a Strange Land: “Metering” Makes
Asylum Rights Meaningless, Immigrant Advocates Say, A.B.A. J. (July 24,
2019, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/3XR3-XWSQ (last visited Dec. 23, 2019)
(“[M]etering has created further barriers of all kinds in the legal process,
including barriers to finding a pro bono lawyer, to those lawyers’ ability to
provide effective representation and even to notifying the immigrants of their
hearings.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Altman, supra
note 49 (explaining how those awaiting their court dates in Mexican cities do
not have access to U.S. attorneys or legal aid services).
51. See Spagat, supra note 44 (noting that teenagers and single adults
pass through far more quickly than families due to the lack of schedule of how
many people are admitted each day, making it hard for families to fit into the
varying quotas).
52. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Al
Otro Lado, Inc., v. Nielsen, No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13,
2018).
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abuse.53 In addition to various statutory claims under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), and Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the lawsuit
alleges violations of procedural due process.54 In July 2019, the
district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss most of
the statutory claims, as well as the due process claim.55 This
decision addressed extraterritoriality issues, as discussed in
Part IV below.
2. The “Remain in Mexico” Policy
The Trump Administration has also adopted a policy that
involves returning non-Mexican asylum seekers who have
passed credible fear interviews to Mexico to wait there for their
court hearings. This “Remain in Mexico” policy was part of the
so-called “Migrant Protection Protocols” (MPP) announced in
December 2018 and implemented on January 28, 2019.56
The DHS first piloted the MPP at the San Ysidro port of
entry on the San Diego-Tijuana border and then expanded it to
El Paso-Juarez and Calexico-Mexicali.57 In June 2019, after the
United States threatened to impose punitive tariffs on Mexico,
the governments reached a deal that expanded the policy along
the entire Southwest border.58
The policy is now applied to people who present themselves
at ports of entry, as well as those who enter illegally between
ports of entry, and to families as well as single adults, although
53. See id. at 1 (alleging the types of unlawful conduct the CBP uses to
deny asylum seekers access to the appropriate asylum process).
54. See id. at 81–82 (arguing that constitutional due process rights are
particularly important as applied to asylum seekers as wrongly denied asylum
can have fatal consequences for the applicant).
55. Order Granting in Part & Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, No.
3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2019), ECF No. 192 [hereinafter
Al Otro Lado, Order on Motion to Dismiss].
56. MPP Press Release, supra note 12.
57. See Tanvi Misra, An Expanded “Remain in Mexico” Policy May Cause
More Suffering, Not Curb Migration, ROLL CALL, (June 10, 2019, 11:59 AM),
https://perma.cc/HKY8-EAGR (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (noting that within
the first six weeks, the MPP had affected over 10,000 asylum seekers across
several cities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. See id. (explaining how President Trump threatened the Mexican
government with tariffs unless Mexico agreed to do more to “curb the arrival
of migrants from Central American and elsewhere to the U.S.-Mexico border”).
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it is not applied to unaccompanied minors.59 By July 2019, over
15,000 asylum seekers were sent back to Mexico under the
MPP.60 The policy has put enormous pressure on nonprofit
organizations in Mexico that assist migrants.61 Because the
shelters are full, asylum seekers, including women and children,
have been forced to live on the streets and in camps in northern
Mexico, where they are exposed to many forms of violence.62
Like “metering,” the “Remain in Mexico” policy can cause family
separations when some members of the family are detained or
released in the United States and others are returned to
Mexico.63
The legal authority on which DHS bases the “Remain in
Mexico” policy is a provision of the Immigration and Nationality
Act that states certain individuals “arriving on land . . . from a
foreign territory contiguous to the United States” may be
returned “to that territory pending a [removal] proceeding

59. See John Burnett, “I Want to Be Sure My Son is Safe:” Asylum-Seekers
Send Children Across Border Alone, NPR (Nov. 27, 2019, 3:41 PM),
https://perma.cc/4M76-RC4Y (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (describing that
adults and families who apply for asylum together are sent back to wait in
Mexico, however unaccompanied minors cannot be returned to Mexico) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. See Joel Rose, Migrant Caregivers Separated from Children at
Border, Sent Back to Mexico, NPR (July 5, 2019, 5:16 AM),
https://perma.cc/FEF3-29RU (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (noting additionally
that two out of three cases are denied, on average, and the applicants sent
back to their country of origin) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
61. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEXICO’S IMMIGRATION CONTROL EFFORTS
(June 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/HE38-EBW2 (PDF) (stating that Mexico’s
Commission for the Aid of Refugees lacks the budget or staff to process
pending and new asylum claims).
62. See WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, CHAOS, CONFUSION, AND DANGER: THE
REMAIN IN MEXICO PROGRAM IN EL PASO 2 (April 23–26, 2019),
https://perma.cc/36ZM-PM77 (PDF) (describing how shelters reaching
capacity in Ciudad Juarez have forced migrant families to live on the
dangerous streets).
63.
See Joel Rose & Laura Smitherman, Fear, Confusion and Separation
as Trump Administration Sends Migrants Back to Mexico, NPR (July 1, 2019,
2:35 PM), https://perma.cc/33AK-AHFU (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (citing
immigration lawyers’ concerns about the increase in family separations
occurring under the new policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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under Section 1229a.”64 Since its enactment in 1996, that
provision has never before been implemented by the United
States government in a systematic way.65 Previously, these
individuals would have remained in the United States pending
their proceedings.66
The DHS has stated in an official memorandum that the
“Remain in Mexico” policy shall be implemented “consistent
with the non-refoulement principles” contained in the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
Convention Against Torture, which prohibit returning someone
to a country where they risk being persecuted or tortured.67 The
procedure that the government has created to accomplish this is
a single interview by an asylum officer.68 That officer must
decide whether an individual is “more likely than not” to face
persecution or torture in Mexico.69 That is the ultimate legal
standard for withholding of removal, and normally it is an
immigration judge who makes that determination at the end of

64. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C) (2018).
65. See Press Release, Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielson Announces Historic
Action to Confront Illegal Immigration, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Dec. 20,
2018), https://perma.cc/6HMU-LSJM (last visited Dec. 24, 2019) (emphasizing
the historic change to “begin the process of invoking” the provision) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See id. (stating that under the MPP, “‘catch and release’ will be
replaced with ‘catch and return,’” where “release” refers to the past practice of
allowing asylum seekers to remain in the United States while awaiting their
court hearing).
67. See Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., Policy Guidance for Implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols,
to L. Francis Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., Kevin K.
McAleenan, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Ronald D. Vitiello, Deputy
Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Jan. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc
/R4EM-RCWK (PDF) (forbidding return “if an alien would more likely than
not be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion”).
68. See Andrew Patterson, Asylum Officers: Remain in Mexico Policy
“Virtually Guarantees” Unlawful Removal of Asylum Seekers, LAWFARE BLOG
(June 28, 2019, 1:59 PM), https://perma.cc/9RNX-HETR (last visited Dec. 24,
2019) (arguing that the standard of proof that applies in credible-fear
interviews is inappropriately high and all but ensures violation of the
non-refoulement obligation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
69. Id.
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a full evidentiary hearing, not an asylum officer at an initial
interview.70
Furthermore, the DHS does not notify asylum seekers that
they will be sent back to Mexico and does not ask them if they
fear being sent there.71 Many asylum seekers from other
countries therefore do not know to state a fear of being sent to
Mexico, even if they are afraid to go there.72 When someone does
state a fear of returning to Mexico, the interview with the
asylum officer is often scheduled within days, which does not
provide the individual time to find a lawyer, gather evidence, or
learn about the legal process.73 There is no right to appeal the
asylum officer’s decision to an immigration judge or the Board
of Immigration Appeals.74 This process offers far fewer
protections than the ordinary credible fear assessment for
asylum.75

70. See id. (stating that the “more likely than not” standard is usually
used in full evidentiary hearings in immigration court where the asylum
seeker has retained legal counsel, had the opportunity to gather evidence, and
may present witnesses).
71. See Maria Sacchetti, U.S. Asylum Officers Say Trump’s “Remain in
Mexico” Policy is Threatening Migrants’ Lives, Ask Federal Court to End It,
WASH. POST (June 27, 2019, 10:58 AM), https://perma.cc/SVR4-J2R7 (last
visited Dec. 24, 2019) (reporting that many asylum officers fear that MPP is
sending asylum seekers back to Mexico without first ensuring they do not fear
persecution or torture there) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
72. See Brief for National CIS Council 119 as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellees at 17, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir.
2019) (No. 19-16487) (explaining that most asylum seekers to whom the MPP
applies are unlikely to spontaneously mention a fear of persecution in Mexico
and emphasizing that, without this unprovoked expression of fear,
immigration agents do not make inquiries about the risk of refoulement).
73. See id. at 19 (stating that the fact the asylum seeker is not provided
time to prepare with counsel before the assessment is especially problematic
because asylum seekers are unaware if they will face persecution should they
be returned to Mexico because they merely passed through en route to the
United States).
74. See id. at 19 (characterizing the asylum officer’s determination as
unreviewable by an immigration judge).
75. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(b) (2018) (explaining the regular asylum
process, which uses the lower “credible fear” standard to evaluate if an asylum
seeker has a valid asylum claim and can therefore move on to plead their case
in a full evidentiary hearing).
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In addition to these procedural inadequacies related to
assessing the risk of persecution or torture in Mexico, the
“Remain in Mexico” policy threatens to deprive individuals of
procedural rights in their removal proceedings, where an
immigration judge must determine if they should be deported to
their home country.76 Being in Mexico makes it much harder for
asylum seekers to find and remain in contact with their legal
representatives during their removal proceedings.77 Those
staying in shelters have limited phone access, making it difficult
to communicate with legal service providers in the United
States.78 Additionally, being in Mexico may make it more
difficult for asylum seekers to receive hearing notices regarding
court dates, which could result in in absentia orders of
deportation if a hearing is missed.79 When returned individuals
finally do get their asylum hearings before an immigration
judge, the hearings are often conducted by video with
inadequate interpretation.80 In south Texas, for instance,
hearings have taken place by video in “makeshift tent courts.”81
In 2019, the Innovation Law Lab and other plaintiffs filed
a federal lawsuit challenging the “Remain in Mexico” policy on
statutory grounds, but it did not allege any constitutional

76. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
77. See Maria Benevento, El Paso Stats Support Concerns About “Remain
in Mexico” Plan, NAT’L CATH. REP. (May 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/38VYXDHV (last visited Dec. 24, 2019) (reporting the percentage of migrants with
legal representation in the Remain in Mexico program to be around thirteen
percent in May 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
78. See id. (reporting on the situation of the 2,800 asylum seekers from
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador who had been returned to Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico in May 2019).
79. See Spagat, supra note 44 (quoting migrants waiting in Mexicali,
Mexico who received anywhere from a day’s notice to a half-hour warning: “If
you’re not ready, you lose your turn. You always have to have your telephone
in reach”).
80. See Open Letter to Inter-Am. Comm’n for Human Rights, Request for
Comprehensive in Loco Visit to the United States and Mexico to Consider
Human Rights Violations Impacting Migrants and Request for Ongoing
Robust Monitoring of the Regional Human Rights Situation Relating to
Migrants 5 (July 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/PLK8-GCDR (PDF) (noting the
new United States policy of removing in-person court interpreters and instead
relying on limited use of telephonic interpretation).
81. Id.
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violations.82 On May 7, 2019, the Ninth Circuit stayed a
preliminary injunction that the lower court had granted,
thereby allowing the policy to go into effect while the litigation
continued.83 The Ninth Circuit’s decision found that the
plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their statutory claims
under the INA and APA, making it even more important to
consider potential due process claims.84
A subsequent decision by a different panel of the Ninth
Circuit held that the administration was exceeding its statutory
authority in implementing the policy,85 but the court stayed its
holding outside the Ninth Circuit.86 The Supreme Court, in a
three-sentence decision, upheld the stay, leaving the “Remain in
Mexico” policy in effect at the time of this writing.87 The
plaintiffs in the current case are not individuals who were
returned to Mexico.88 However, if returned individuals seek to
challenge the “Remain in Mexico” policy on due process grounds,
courts will need to address extraterritorial issues in considering
those constitutional claims.89
B. Expedited Removal and Its Expansion
President Trump’s 2017 Executive Order on Border
Enforcement also directed the DHS to increase the use of

82. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 31–36,
Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No.
3:19-cv-00807-RS) (enumerating claims for relief based on various statutory
grounds).
83. See Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir.
2019) (invalidating the preliminary injunction by granting a motion for a stay
pending appeal).
84. See id. (stating that the preliminary injunction, in its present form, is
unlikely to be sustained on appeal).
85. Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2020).
86. Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2020).
87. Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, No. 19A960, 2020 WL 1161432, at *1
(U.S. Mar. 11, 2020) (mem.).
88. See Brief for Local 1924 as Amici Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellees’ Answering Brief & Affirmance of the District Court’s
Decision at i, Innovation Law Lab, 924 F.3d (No.19-15716) (listing out the
remaining Appellees as consisting only of organizations that provide
asylum-related legal services).
89. See infra Part III.
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expedited removal.90 Under the INA, the Secretary of DHS may
designate for expedited removal “any or all aliens” who have
“not been admitted or paroled into the United States” (i.e. who
entered without valid documents or through fraud or
misrepresentation) and who have been “physically present in
the United States continuously” for less than two years.91 For
the past fifteen years, the designated class of noncitizens subject
to expedited removal included those who had not been legally
admitted, were apprehended within 100 miles of the border, and
could not establish fourteen days of continuous physical
presence in the United States.92
In an expedited removal case, the DHS swiftly removes
noncitizens without further review or any court hearing.93 There
is only one exception: if the noncitizen expresses a fear of
persecution or torture during an initial interview with a CBP
officer.94 In that situation, CBP must refer the individual to an
asylum officer for a credible fear interview.95 If the asylum
officer finds no credible fear of persecution, then the noncitizen
is promptly removed.96 If the officer finds a credible fear, the

90. See Kelly, supra note 30, at 5–7 (expanding expedited removal
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2018) to new classes of migrants).
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2018).
92. See Notice Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg.
48,877, 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004) [hereinafter “2004 Designation”] (classifying as
eligible for expedited removal only aliens who are encountered within 100
miles of the border and cannot establish their continuous presence in the
country for more than fourteen days).
93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (explaining that if an officer
“determines an alien does not have credible fear of persecution” they have full
authority to order the alien’s removal from the United States “without further
hearing or review”).
94. Id. (creating an exception to expedited removal if the individual
indicates either “an intention to apply for asylum” or a “fear of prosecution”).
95. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring immigration officers to refer
those aliens seeking asylum or claiming fear of persecution to an asylum
officer for interviewing).
96. See id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (“[I]f the officer determines that an alien
does not have a credible fear of persecution, the officer shall order the alien
removed from the United States without further hearing or review.”); see also
8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d) (2019) (setting forth the asylum officer’s interview protocol
for determining whether a “credible fear” exists).
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person is placed in full removal proceedings that take place
before an immigration judge.97
Expedited removal proceedings not only limit the right to a
hearing, but also the right to judicial review.98 Specifically, the
INA provides that an individual in expedited removal
proceedings may file a habeas petition in federal district court
to contest only three, limited determinations: whether the
person is a noncitizen, whether the person “was ordered
removed” via expedited removal, and whether the person is a
permanent resident or has another lawful status exempting him
or her from expedited removal.99 Review of whether someone
“was ordered removed” is limited to whether such an order was
in fact issued and whether it relates to the petitioner.100
A court may not review “whether the alien is actually
inadmissible or entitled to any form of relief from removal.”101
The only possible way to obtain judicial review of such issues
would be through a constitutional challenge.102 However, a
circuit split has emerged regarding whether noncitizens may
challenge an expedited removal order through habeas corpus.103
As explained in Part IV below, this issue raises
extraterritoriality issues because some courts have decided to
treat individuals in expedited removal proceedings as if they

97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (noting that referred aliens “shall be
detained for further consideration of the application for asylum”); see also 8
C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (establishing that a “credible fear” finding triggers issuance
of “a Form I–863, Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge”); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B) (2019) (“If the immigration judge finds that the alien,
other than an alien stowaway, possesses a credible fear of persecution or
torture, the immigration judge shall vacate the order of the asylum
officer . . . .”).
98. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (limiting judicial review to three narrow
determinations).
99. See id. § 1252(e)(2)(A)–(C) (explaining the curtailment of traditional
habeas corpus proceedings in this context).
100. See id. § 1252(e)(5) (“[T]he court’s inquiry shall be limited to whether
such an order in fact was issued and whether it relates to the petitioner.”).
101. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. §1003.42(f) (2019) (“No appeal shall lie from a
review of an adverse credible fear determination made by an immigration
judge.”).
102. See infra Part III.B.
103. See infra Part IV.B.

772

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751 (2020)

were standing at the border, even though they were
apprehended after entering the United States.104
On July 22, 2019, the DHS issued a notice announcing that
it was expanding expedited removal to apply to noncitizens
apprehended anywhere in the United States who entered
without documents or through fraud or misrepresentation and
have not been continuously physically present in the country for
at least two years.105 The change became effective the very next
day.106 Thus, the new policy eliminates the geographic
restriction on expedited removal altogether and dramatically
increases the period of physical presence during which it is
allowed for individuals who enter by land.
As a result of this change, an estimated 328,000 more
people will be vulnerable to expedited removal.107 Even
individuals apprehended in the interior of the country who have
established families, businesses, and homes in the United
States may be subjected to speedy deportations without a court
hearing.108 The dramatic expansion of expedited removal makes
the issue of whether an expedited removal order may be
constitutionally challenged all the more urgent.
C. Cross-Border Uses of Force
While the 2017 Executive Order on Border Enforcement did
not announce any new policies regarding the use of force, it
described illegal immigration to the United States as “a
significant threat to national security and public safety,” one
that “presents a clear and present danger to the interests of the
United States.”109 The order emphasized the operations of
104. See infra Part IV.B.
105. See 2019 Designation, supra note 13, at 35,410 (noting that DHS
asserted the policy change did not require notice-and-comment rulemaking
but nevertheless accepted comments for sixty days after July 23, 2019).
106. See id. (“This Notice, including the New Designation, is effective on
July 23, 2019.”).
107. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, EXPANDED EXPEDITED REMOVAL 2
(2019), https://perma.cc/CXN7-867M (PDF) (“The regulation potentially exposes
more than 328,000 additional people to expedited removal, limiting their
access to immigration hearings and to due process generally.”).
108. See 2019 Designation, supra note 13, at 35,410 (permitting the speedy
deportation of even the most established individuals so long as they have not
been in the United States for more than two years).
109. EO on Border Security, supra note 24, at 8,793.
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transnational criminal organizations and stated that “[a]mong
those who illegally enter are those who seek to harm Americans
through acts of terror or criminal conduct.”110 This rhetoric
characterizing border enforcement as a national security issue
affects decisions regarding the use of force.111
Of course, the use of force by CBP officers in deterring
migrants from entering the United States is not new; on the
contrary, it is a longstanding issue.112 Even under the Obama
Administration, the DOJ had a poor track record of pursuing
criminal or civil charges in such cases.113 According to a
December 2013 report, the DOJ was “not able to show any cases
in which it recommended civil or criminal charges against a
CBP agent or officer who killed in the line of duty in at least the
past six years.”114 Due to numerous incidents involving the
lethal use of force by CBP officers under the Obama
Administration, the agency reviewed its use of use-of-force
policy and issued a revised version in 2014.115 That revised
policy requires force to be “objectively reasonable,” prohibits
“excessive force,” and permits “deadly force” only when there is
“reasonable belief” that an individual “poses an imminent

110. Id.
111. See KATHRYN HAMPTON, ZERO PROTECTION: HOW U.S. BORDER
ENFORCEMENT HARMS MIGRANT SAFETY AND HEALTH 6–7 (2019), https://
perma.cc/NCB6-DY7G (PDF) (describing the ways in which increased
militarization of the United States Border Patrol agency had adversely
effected migrants’ physical safety).
112. See Bob Ortega & Rob O’Dell, Deadly Border Agent Incidents Cloaked
in Silence, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar. 28, 2014, 11:06 AM) https://perma.cc/JN8JDEXL (last updated Mar. 28, 2014, 1:51 PM) (last visited Jan. 4, 2020) (noting
that Border Patrol agents have faced few repercussions for illegitimate use of
deadly force since at least the early 2000s) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
113. See id. (noting that this period of relative immunity persisted even
during the Obama administration).
114. Id.
115. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT.
USE OF FORCE REVIEW: CASES AND POLICIES 2–3 (2013), https://perma.cc/HZ5NHDEE (PDF) (recommending substantive changes to departmental policies,
including on use of force); see also DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., CBP USE OF FORCE TRAINING AND ACTIONS TO ADDRESS USE OF
FORCE INCIDENTS (REDACTED) 8–11 (2013), https://perma.cc/3E89-DPBZ (PDF)
(recommending substantive changes to U.S. Customs and Border Protection
use of force policy).
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danger of death or serious bodily injury” to the officer or another
person.116
Although concerns regarding the use of force are not new,
the Trump Administration has made certain novel and highly
controversial decisions regarding the use of force that reflect the
notion that illegal immigration poses an urgent threat to
national security.117 For example, on November 1, 2018,
President Trump deployed 5,900 active-duty military troops and
2,100 National Guard forces to the U.S.-Mexico border to
“defend” CBP officers from an approaching caravan of
migrants.118 The White House specifically authorized these
military troops to use force, “including lethal force where
necessary.”119 Such widespread authorization for thousands of
military troops to use force in the defense of border patrol agents
on United States soil was unprecedented.120 Trump also told the
troops to treat any migrants throwing rocks as if they had a
firearm, which would violate CBP’s own use-of-force policy, but
he later backed down from that position.121
116. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT. OFFICE OF TRAINING AND DEV., USE
FORCE POLICY, GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 1 (2014), https://
perma.cc/6MRJ-KSQQ (PDF).
117. While incidents involving the use of force have generally decreased
since 2013, the raw numbers remain high, involving over 900 singular uses of
force in FY 2018 related to firearms, “less-lethal devices,” such as batons,
electronic control weapons, and the PepperBall Launching System, and force
against vehicles or vessels. See CBP Use of Force Statistics Fiscal Year 2018,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://perma.cc/AQ7C-2PLA (last
modified Mar. 5, 2019) (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (recording 913 such uses of
force in Fiscal Year 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See Tara Copp, White House Approves Use of Force, Some Law
Enforcement Roles for Border Troops, MILITARY TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://
perma.cc/5CYR-G639 (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“The White House late
Tuesday signed a memo allowing troops stationed at the border to engage in
some law enforcement roles and use lethal force, if necessary . . . .”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
119. Id.
120. See id. (“Military forces always have the inherent right to self defense,
but defense of the border agents on U.S. soil is new.”).
121. See Ted Hessen, Rebecca Morin & Andrew Restuccia, ‘Consider It a
Rifle:’ Trump Says Migrants Throwing Rocks Will Be Treated as Armed,
POLITICO (Nov. 1, 2018, 11:15 AM), https://perma.cc/CP6Y-UMBZ (last
updated Nov. 1, 2018) (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“The [CBP] handbook says
agents should not discharge firearms in response to thrown or launched
projectiles unless the agent has reason to believe the subject ‘poses an
OF
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Shortly thereafter, on November 25, 2018, CBP officers
used tear gas on a crowd of migrants that included women and
children after a group rushed towards the border fence in
Tijuana.122 Many of the migrants intended to seek asylum in the
United States.123 Trump downplayed the harm caused by the
tear gas, describing it as “very safe.”124 But, a picture of a woman
with two distressed children in diapers trying to escape the tear
gas that was circulated widely online gave a very different
impression.125
On January 1, 2019, CBP officers again used tear gas and
pepper spray on a crowd of migrants in Tijuana.126 While CBP
alleged that it used the tear gas after some officers were hit by
rocks, journalists reported seeing rock-throwing by migrants
only after the tear gas was deployed.127 Mexico demanded a
thorough investigation of these two incidents, describing tear
gas as a “non-lethal weapon” that was launched into Mexico.128
imminent danger of serious physical injury or death’ to the agent or another
person.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
122. See Maya Averbuch & Elisabeth Malkin, Migrants in Tijuana Run to
U.S. Border, but Fall Back in Face of Tear Gas, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2018),
https://perma.cc/DG4M-59W8 (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“[T]he United States
Customs and Border Protection agency shut down the border crossing in both
directions and fired tear gas to push back migrants from the border fence.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
123. See id. (“The backlog of people waiting to request asylum at a
checkpoint has swelled . . . .”).
124. Migrant Caravan: Trump Defends Tear Gas on Mexico Border, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/F8KE-VR6K (last visited Jan. 5, 2020)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
125. See id. (“However, this was disputed by some journalists at the scene,
who said the tear gas was painful even from a significant distance away.”).
126. See Paulina Villegas & Alan Yuhas, Mexico Calls on U.S. to
Investigate Use of Tear Gas at Border, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2019), https://
perma.cc/573J-FN3P (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“Mexico has asked the United
States for an investigation into American border officers’ actions along the
nations’ shared border, two days after agents near San Diego used tear gas,
smoke and pepper spray to repel a group of migrants trying to cross into the
United States.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. See id. (“The Associated Press reported that women, children and
journalists were affected by the tear gas, and that its journalists saw rocks
thrown only after the tear gas was launched.”).
128. See id. (noting that “Mexico has asked the United States for an
investigation into American border officers’ actions” after the tear gas
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Organizations, including the ACLU and Amnesty International,
criticized these indiscriminate uses of tear gas as
disproportionate.129
Under the Constitution, an excessive force claim is
normally brought under the Fourth Amendment, but it may also
be brought under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause in
situations where the Fourth Amendment does not provide
protection.130 Lawsuits have challenged the domestic use of tear
gas by law enforcement officers in various situations as
violating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.131 Although
lawsuits were not filed challenging the cross-border uses of tear
gas described above, at least two cases involving cross-border
shootings of Mexican teenagers have been litigated in the
appellate courts, resulting in a circuit split.132 Those cases are
discussed in Part IV below and raise challenging
extraterritoriality issues because they involved United States

incident); see also Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Administration Official Defends
Tear Gas Use at Mexico Border, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2018, 11:39 AM), https://
perma.cc/XPP8-YYWN (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“A day after the incident,
Mexico’s foreign ministry presented a diplomatic note to the U.S. government
calling for ‘a full investigation’ into what it described as non-lethal weapons
directed toward Mexican territory.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
129. See Megan Specia & Rick Gladstone, Border Agents Shot Tear Gas
into Mexico. Was It Legal?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/ENF6HJ7R (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (noting that the presence of “women, children,
and asylum seekers” in the area where tear gas was fired weighs strongly in
favor of characterization as a disproportionate American response) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
130. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (“This case requires
us to decide what constitutional standard governs a free citizen’s claim that
law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an
arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person. We hold that such
claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
131. See Dakwar, supra note 15 (describing domestic lawsuits filed by the
ACLU challenging the use of tear gas).
132. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (disallowing
a Bivens action to proceed where the victim, a Mexican national, had been
fatally shot by American Border Patrol agents on Mexican soil); Rodriguez v.
Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018) (allowing a Bivens action to proceed
where the victim, a Mexican national, had been fatally shot by American
Border Patrol agents on Mexican soil); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing
these two cross-border shooting cases).
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agents acting on United States soil, although the victims were
in Mexico.133
III. Determining the Constitution’s Extraterritorial Reach
For over a century, the Supreme Court has considered
whether various constitutional rights apply extraterritorially.134
The Court has addressed these questions in a case-by-case
manner, rejecting any strict rule based on territory.135 The two
dominant approaches now used to determine the
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution are the “substantial
connections” approach articulated in Verdugo136 and the
“functional” approach set forth in Boumediene.137 In addition,
the Court historically used a “fundamental rights” approach in
determining
which
constitutional
rights
apply
to
unincorporated United States territories, which continues to
implicitly influence decisions today.138 These extraterritoriality
approaches, none of which require physical presence in the
United States to trigger constitutional protections, are
discussed in Part III.A below.139
At the same time, the Supreme Court has issued numerous
precedents discussing the political branches’ plenary power over
immigration that do rely on territoriality as a trigger for
extending certain constitutional rights, such as due process, to
133. See infra Part IV.A.
134. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (considering
whether residents of the Philippines were constitutionally entitled to jury
trials).
135. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1990)
(“And certainly, it is not open to us in light of the Insular Cases to endorse the
view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the United States
Government exercises its power.”).
136. See id. at 271 (“These cases, however, establish only that aliens
receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of
the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.”).
137. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008) (stating “[t]he idea
that extraterritoriality questions turn on objective factors and practical
concerns, not formalism”).
138. See infra Part III.B.
139. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting
that the “alien citizenship” of Afghani petitioners detained by the United
States government in Afghanistan as enemy combatants did “not weigh
against their claim to protection of the right of habeas corpus”).
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noncitizens.140 Yet there are also plenary power cases that
recognize exceptions to this territorial approach, including those
pertaining to the “entry fiction” doctrine that treats certain
noncitizens who are physically present in the United States as
if they had not entered the country.141 These plenary power
cases and the tensions they create with the Court’s
extraterritoriality approaches are discussed in Part III.B below.
A. Extraterritoriality Approaches
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions present two different,
but overlapping approaches for analyzing the extraterritorial
reach of constitutional rights in cases involving noncitizens: the
“substantial connections” approach and a multi-factor,
“functional” approach. Additionally, a much older body of case
law applied a “fundamental rights” approach, which is also
included here, because the nature of a right (i.e. whether it is
“fundamental”) continues to influence decision making in this
area.
1. The “Substantial Connections” Approach
The “substantial connections” approach reflects a theory
that constitutional rights should be based on “membership,”
being part of a social contract that triggers constitutional
protections.142 “Membership” theory focuses on signs of
belonging, which could be based on either status (e.g.
citizenship, immigration status) or location (being inside a
sovereign’s territory).143 While the “substantial connections”
140. See infra Part III.B.
141. See infra Part III.B.
142. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 917–18 (distinguishing the
“membership” and “mutuality of obligation approaches”); see also Elizabeth A.
Wilson, The War on Terrorism and “The Water’s Edits:” Sovereignty,
“Territorial Jurisdiction,” and the Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the
Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165, 183 (2006) (“In the
‘membership’ view, the reach of the Constitution is limited by the scope of the
social contract: the act of social consensus that leads to the formation of the
government, as represented by the written Constitution.”); Gerald L. Neuman,
Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOYOLA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2004) (“The first
kind of approach, a membership approach, treats certain individuals or locales
as participating in a privileged relationship with the constitutional project,
and therefore entitled to the benefit of constitutional provisions.”).
143. Wilson, supra note 142, at 184.
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approach was most clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in
Verdugo,144 its roots are in a much earlier decision,
Eisentrager,145 which involved the post-WWII occupation of
Germany.146
In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court considered whether
German nationals convicted by a United States military
commission of violating the laws of war and sent to the
Landsberg Prison in Germany, where they were in the custody
of the United States army, could invoke the writ of habeas
corpus to challenge their detention.147 The Court held that they
had no right to habeas corpus.148 Justice Jackson, writing for the
majority, explained that a noncitizen is “accorded
a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society.”149 In describing different types of
status along this spectrum, Justice Jackson distinguished
non-resident “enemy aliens” and resident “enemy aliens,” noting
that the latter had the “privilege of access to our courts” because
“the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction gave the
Judiciary power to act.”150 He then reasoned that non-resident
“enemy aliens” must have fewer rights than resident “enemy
aliens.”151
144. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 271 (“These cases, however, establish only that
aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the
territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with the
country.”).
145. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950) (“The ultimate
question in this case is one of jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States
vis-a-vis military authorities in dealing with enemy aliens overseas.”).
146. See id. at 765–66 (“On May 8, 1945, the German High Command
executed an act of unconditional surrender, expressly obligating all forces
under German control at once to cease active hostilities.”).
147. See id. at 765 (“Twenty-one German nationals petitioned the District
Court of the District of Columbia for writs of habeas corpus.”).
148. See id. at 768 (reasoning that the German nationals were not entitled
to the writ, being that they were enemy aliens who had never stepped foot
within the “territorial jurisdiction” of the United States).
149. Id. at 770.
150. Id. at 771.
151. See id. at 777–78 (“[T]he privilege of litigation has been extended to
aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in
the country implied protection. No such basis can be invoked here, for these
prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United
States is sovereign . . . .”).
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Although the petitioners in Eisentrager had not invoked the
Fifth Amendment, the Court went on to address the
extraterritorial application of the Due Process Clause because
the lower court had addressed due process in reasoning that the
“[r]ight to the writ . . . is a subsidiary procedural right that
follows from possession of substantive constitutional rights.”152
The Court rejected a reading of the Due Process Clause that
interpreted the words “no person” to extend protections to “alien
enemies anywhere in the world.”153 The Court feared a
cascading effect, whereby extending the Fifth Amendment
would require extending the “companion civil-rights
Amendments” to enemy aliens during a military occupation.154
Additionally, the Court concluded that it would be a “paradox”
to extend due process rights to enemies when United States
citizens soldiers were “stripped of their Fifth Amendment
rights” upon being conscripted and subjected to military
discipline.155 Justice Jackson concluded by declaring that no
court or scholarly commentary supported extraterritorial
application of the Constitution and that “the practice of every
modern government is opposed to it.”156 While Eisentrager’s
language suggests that strict territoriality is required for
constitutional rights to apply to noncitizens, subsequent
decisions clearly rejected that notion, drawing more on the
concept of membership that Eisentrager described.157
In Verdugo, decided forty years later, the Court drew on
Eisentrager in articulating the “substantial connections”
approach.158 Verdugo-Urquidez was a suspected Mexican cartel
leader who was arrested in Mexico by Mexican authorities and

152. Id. at 781.
153. Id. at 781–82.
154. Id. at 782–84.
155. Id. at 783.
156. Id. at 784–85.
157. See id. at 770 (“The alien, to whom the United States has been
traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of
rights as he increases his identity with our society.”).
158. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990)
(“The Eisentrager opinion acknowledged that in some cases constitutional
provisions extend beyond the citizenry; ‘the alien . . . has been accorded a
generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our
society.’”).
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brought to the United States for trial.159 United States and
Mexican agents then searched his home in Mexico without a
warrant and seized evidence that he was involved in smuggling
drugs.160 Verdugo-Urquidez argued that the search and seizure
of his home violated the Fourth Amendment, but the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply.161
The Court based its decision partly on the text of the Fourth
Amendment, which uses the term “the people.”162 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explained that this “seems
to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the
Constitution,” including the Preamble, Article I, and the First,
Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.”163 He
contrasted the use of “the people” in these Amendments with
the words “person” and “accused” used in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments respectively.164 He concluded that “the people”
only “refers to a class of persons who are part of the national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”165

159. See id. at 262 (“In January 1986, Mexican police
officers . . . apprehended Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico and transported him to
the United States Border Patrol station in Calexico, California. There, United
States marshals arrested respondent and eventually moved him to a
correctional center in San Diego, California, where he remains incarcerated
pending trial.”).
160. See id. (“Following respondent’s arrest, Terry Bowen, a DEA agent
assigned to the Calexico DEA office, decided to arrange for searches of
Verdugo-Urquidez’s Mexican residences located in Mexicali and San Felipe.”).
161. See id. at 278 (“The conditions and considerations of this case would
make adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
impracticable and anomalous.”).
162. See id. at 265 (“While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive,
it suggests that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to
a class of persons who are part of a national community . . . .”).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 265–66 (inferring that the Framers intended “the people”
in the Fourth Amendment to protect a narrower group than those protected
by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
165. Id. (emphasis added).
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Invoking Eisentrager’s notion of a scale of constitutional
rights and drawing on the Insular Cases,166 which involved
residents of United States territories, Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that if not every constitutional provision applies to
residents of United States territories, then noncitizens in other
places have an “even weaker” claim to the Fourth Amendment’s
protection.167 Justice Rehnquist also described Eisentrager as
“reject[ing] the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth
Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United
States.”168 Although that part of Eisentrager was dicta, Justice
Rehnquist reinforced it by stating, “our rejection of
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment was
emphatic.”169 He reasoned that if this is true of the Fifth
Amendment, “which speaks in the relatively universal term of
‘person,’ it would seem even more true with respect to the
Fourth Amendment, which applies only to the ‘people’”170
While Verdugo cited numerous plenary power cases holding
that noncitizens enjoy certain constitutional rights if they are
physically present in the United States, Justice Rehnquist
found that these cases “establish only that aliens receive
constitutional protections when they have come within the
territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections to this country.”171 The Court distinguished
Lopez-Mendoza, in which it had assumed that the Fourth
Amendment applied to undocumented noncitizens in
166. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 200 (1901) (holding that Puerto
Rico was not a foreign country for purposes of tariff law after it was formally
ceded by Spain to the United States); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221,
221–22 (1901) (concluding that neither Puerto Rico nor Hawaii were foreign
countries); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 235–36 (1901) (finding that
the President lacked the authority to exact unlimited duties on Puerto Rico
following Spain’s cession of Puerto Rico to the United States); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that while Puerto Rico was a
territory of the United States, it was not a part of the United States for the
purposes of the “revenue clauses of the Constitution”); Armstrong v. United
States, 182 U.S. 243, 244 (1901) (disallowing duties to be imposed on American
goods entering Puerto Rico following the ratification of the Treaty of Paris);
Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392, 397 (1901) (concluding that sea
trade with Puerto Rico was domestic in nature, not international).
167. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1990).
168. Id. at 269.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
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deportation proceedings, explaining that the noncitizens in that
case “were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had
accepted some societal obligations.”172
Lastly, Justice Rehnquist found that, as in Eisentrager,
extending the Fourth Amendment to Verdugo would have
“significant and deleterious consequences for the United States
in conducting activities beyond its borders.”173 He expressed
concern that extending the Fourth Amendment to overseas
search and seizure operations, including military operations,
“could disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to
foreign situations involving our national interest.”174 Global
application of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Rehnquist
reasoned, would “plunge [the Executive and Legislative
Branches] into a sea of uncertainty as to what might be
reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted
abroad,” especially since a warrant would be “a dead letter
outside the United States.”175
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence agreed that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply, but disagreed with the Court’s
reasoning. In particular, he did not place “any weight on the
reference to ‘the people’ in the Fourth Amendment as a source
of restricting its protections.”176 Instead, Justice Kennedy found
that applying the Fourth Amendment in this case “would make
adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
impractical and anomalous.”177 This reasoning drew on Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Reid, a case holding that the United
States citizen spouses of servicemen stationed abroad had a
right to a jury trial on murder charges under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments and could not be tried by court martial.178 Justice
172. Id. at 273.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 273–74.
175. Id. at 274.
176. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
177. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279 (1990)
(emphasis added).
178. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) as “good authority for the
proposition that there is no rigid rule that jury trial must always be provided
in the trial of an American overseas, if the circumstances are such that trial
by jury would be impractical and anomalous”).
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Harlan had interpreted the Court’s precedents as rejecting any
“rigid and abstract rule” and emphasized considering whether
adherence to a constitutional guarantee would be “altogether
impractical and anomalous.”179 He approached the
constitutional question based on “the particular circumstances,
the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives which
Congress had before it.”180
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence followed Justice Harlan’s
approach and focused on the practical obstacles involved in
extending the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements
abroad.181 The practical concerns he identified included the
“absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue
warrants [in Mexico], the differing and perhaps unascertainable
conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad,
and the need to cooperate with foreign officials.”182 Like Justice
Harlan, he interpreted precedents, including the Insular Cases,
as consistent with this “impracticable and anomalous”
approach.183 Justice Kennedy subsequently developed this
analysis into the “functional” approach in Boumediene,
described below, where he wrote the majority decision.184
2. The “Functional” Approach
In 2008, the Court decided Boumediene, which represented
a significant milestone in precedents analyzing the
extraterritorial application of constitutional rights. Boumediene
held that foreign nationals detained at Guantánamo Bay had a
right to file habeas petitions under the Suspension Clause,
invalidating Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act, which
179. Id. at 74.
180. Id. at 75.
181. See Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[R]estrictions that the United States must observe with reference to aliens
beyond its territory or jurisdiction depend . . . on general principles of
interpretation, not on an inquiry as to who formed the Constitution or a
construction that some rights are mentioned as being those of ‘the people.’”).
182. Id. at 278–79 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74).
183. See id. at 277–78 (concluding that there is no “rigid and abstract rule”
that the Court must apply the Constitution “no matter what the conditions
and considerations”).
184. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) (“We hold that
petitioners may invoke the fundamental procedural protections of habeas
corpus.”).
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stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over such petitions.185 In
rejecting the government’s argument that the Suspension
Clause did not protect foreign nationals detained outside of the
United States, the Court stressed that its precedents, including
Verdugo, had not followed a strict territorial approach.186
Justice Kennedy, now writing for the majority, adopted a
“functional” approach that draws on the “impracticable and
anomalous” reasoning of his concurrence in Verdugo.187 He
explained that “questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective
factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”188 Once again, he
interpreted precedents, including the Insular Cases, Reid, and
Eisentrager, as consistent with this approach, highlighting ways
that they all considered practical concerns.189
In addition, Justice Kennedy stressed that the
government’s proposed sovereignty-based test raised “troubling
separation-of-powers concerns.”190 Because the political
branches have “the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern
territory,” allowing them to decide “when and where [the
Constitution’s] terms apply” would give them the “power to
switch the Constitution on or off at will,” thereby “permit[ting]
a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government” and
“leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not
this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”191
Noting that the writ of habeas corpus is itself an essential
check on separation of powers, Justice Kennedy found it critical
to ensure that “the test for determining the scope of this
provision must not be subject to manipulation by those whose

185. See id. at 795–98 (stating that the “common thread” of the Insular
Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid is the idea that questions of extraterritoriality
turn on “objective factors and practical concerns”).
186. See id. at 755–65 (discussing the “practical considerations” weighed
in the Court’s extraterritorial precedent).
187. See id. at 767 (considering “the practical obstacles” in applying the
Constitution in this case).
188. Id. at 764.
189. See id. at 756–64 (analyzing the “common thread uniting” the Court’s
extraterritorial precedent).
190. Id. at 764.
191. Id. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
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power it is designed to restrain.”192 The test that Justice
Kennedy came up with and applied in Boumediene identified:
at least three factors [as] relevant in determining the reach
of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of
the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which
that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the
sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s
entitlement to the writ.193

While citizenship is part of the first factor, Boumediene
makes it clear that citizenship is not determinative.194
Regarding status, also part of the first factor, the Court noted
that the petitioners denied that they were “enemy combatants,”
and in any case were in a better situation than the petitioners
in Eisentrager, who were convicted war criminals.195 The Court
also examined the adequacy of the process through which the
status determination was made and observed that, unlike in
Eisentrager, “there ha[d] been no trial by military commission
for violations of the laws of war.”196 The Eisentrager petitioners
were “entitled to representation by counsel, allowed to introduce
evidence on their own behalf, and permitted to cross-examine
the prosecution’s witnesses” in an adversarial proceeding,
whereas the Boumediene petitioners had their status
determined by Combatant Status Review Tribunals, which
provided far fewer procedural protections.197 Among other
things, they were not represented by an attorney.198 The
192. Id. at 765–66.
193. Id. at 766.
194. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(“[C]learly the alien citizenship of the petitioners in this case does not weigh
against their claim to protection of the right of habeas corpus under the
Suspension Clause. So far as citizenship is concerned, they differ in no
material respect from the petitioners at Guantanamo who prevailed in
Boumediene.”); Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 729 (9th Cir. 2018)
(explaining that “[n]either citizenship nor voluntary submission to American
law is a prerequisite for constitutional rights” and that “citizenship is just one
of several non-dispositive factors to consider”).
195. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766–67 (2008).
196. Id. at 767; see also Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96 (noting that the
“Eisentrager petitioners were in a weaker position by having the status of war
criminals . . . .”).
197. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767.
198. Id.
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Boumediene Court concluded that these differences in
procedural protections were “not trivial.”199
Turning next to the nature of the site (Guantánamo Bay),
the Court focused primarily on the level of United States
control.200 Although the Court did not find that either de jure or
de facto sovereignty was determinative, it placed great weight
on the fact that the United States had total control over
Guantánamo Bay and had maintained that control for over a
century, despite a hostile government’s de jure sovereignty over
the property.201 By contrast, in Eisentrager, the United States
had only temporary control over the Landsberg prison in
Germany.202
The Court then examined the practical obstacles in
recognizing a right to habeas corpus. One of the main
considerations was national security.203 The Court observed
that “if the detention facility were located in an active theater
of war, arguments that issuing the writ would be ‘impractical or
anomalous’ would have more weight.”204 The Court
distinguished Eisentrager, which involved a post-war
occupation where many wartime problems remained, noting
199. Id.; see also Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96 (observing that the “adequacy
of process” factor cut in favor of petitioners, who were detainees at Bagram
Airfield in Afghanistan, because their status had been determined by the
“Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board,” which afforded even fewer
procedural protections than the Combatant Status Review Tribunals in
Boumediene).
200. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770–71 (distinguishing the amount of
control the United States government had over the detainees in Guantánamo
Bay from the amount of control the United States had over the detainees
involved in Eisentrager).
201. Id.
202. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766 (1950) (discussing the
United States’ control in post-war Germany); see also Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at
97 (analogizing the United States’ involvement with Bagram Airfield in
Afghanistan to temporary control of the Landsberg prison in Eisentrager). The
D.C. Circuit distinguished Boumediene by noting that “[i]n Bagram, while the
United States has options as to duration of the lease agreement, there is no
indication of any intent to occupy the base with permanence, nor is there
hostility on the part of the ‘host’ country.” Id.
203. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769–70 (explaining that the threats
present in Eisentrager were “not apparent” in Guantánamo Bay).
204. Id. at 770; cf. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97 (distinguishing Boumediene
on the basis that Bagram Airfield, unlike Guantánamo Bay, was an active
“theater of war”).
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that “American forces stationed in Germany faced potential
security threats from a defeated enemy.”205 Based on its analysis
of these factors, the Court concluded that the petitioners were
entitled to invoke the writ of habeas corpus.206 Additionally, the
Court found that the Detainee Treatment Act’s (DTA) review
process, which could take years, was an inadequate substitute
for the writ.207 The Boumediene Court never reached the
petitioners’ due process argument.208
3. The “Fundamental Rights” Approach
While the two approaches discussed above represent the
dominant ways of analyzing constitutional extraterritoriality
issues today, there is also an older, “fundamental rights”
approach that continues to influence decisions implicitly. The
“fundamental rights” approach emerged in the early 1900s in
the Insular Cases, which involved unincorporated United States
territories that were never intended to become part of the

205. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769; see also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784
(expressing concern about judicial interference with the military’s efforts to
contain “enemy elements, guerilla fighters, and ‘werewolves’”).
206. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).
207. See id. at 794–95 (“[T]he DTA review procedures are an inadequate
substitute for habeas corpus.”).
208. See id. at 785 (making “no judgment whether the CSRTs, as currently
constituted, satisfy due process standards”); see also Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d
990, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that Boumediene did not address whether the
due process clause applied to the Guantánamo detainees). Some federal
courts, however, have misconstrued Boumediene as rejecting the due process
claims. See Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[I]t
remains the law of this circuit that, after Boumediene, aliens detained at
Guantanamo may not invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.”); Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he due process clause does not apply to aliens without property or
presence in the sovereign territory of the United States.”), vacated and
remanded, 559 U.S. 131 (2010), judgment reinstated and modified, 605 F.3d
1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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United States.209 In Downes v. Bidwell,210 the first of the Insular
Cases, the Court recognized that “unrestrained possession of
power” could engulf the territories’ inhabitants, which included
both citizens and noncitizens, in “centralized despotism.”211 The
Court found that the Constitution guarded against such
despotism by protecting certain “fundamental rights.”212 Thus,
while the Court did not extend full constitutional protections to
inhabitants of the territories, it recognized that some set of
fundamental protections applied.213
Cases from the early 1900s defined fundamental rights as
those that are the “basis of all free government”214 or impose
“limitations in favor of personal rights,”215 while more modern
decisions defined them as being “fundamental in [the]
international sense” of incorporating the “shared beliefs of

209. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 8, at 1642–43 (discussing lower court
treatment of the applicability of the Due Process Clause outside of the United
States); Sean Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American Samoa and the
Last U.S. Nationals, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 99 (2013) (examining the
Insular Cases); Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the
Extraterritorial Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 325–27 (2011)
[hereinafter Lobel, Fundamental Norms] (same); Christina Duffy Burnett, A
Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 973, 982–84 (2009) (analyzing Boumediene’s effect on the Insular Cases);
Robert Katz, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the Constitution to
U.S. Territories, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 782–83 (1992) (identifying the
“fundamental rights” that the Insular Cases determined applied to the
unincorporated territories).
210. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
211. See id. at 280 (holding that Puerto Rico became a territory of the
United States but was not part of the United States under the Revenue Clause
of the Constitution).
212. Id. at 291 (White, J., concurring).
213. See id. at 283 (“Even if regarded as aliens, they are entitled under the
principles of the Constitution to be protected in life, liberty, and property.”);
see also Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the
United States and its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445,
458–59 (1992) (describing Congress’s ability to determine which territories are
incorporated and thus protected by constitutional rights).
214. Downes, 182 U.S. at 291 (White, J., concurring).
215. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146 (1904) (quoting Late Corp.
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 44 (1890)).
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diverse cultures.”216 To determine if a right is fundamental,
courts looked at the specific right in question, not the entire
constitutional Amendment.217 Thus, the Fifth Amendment right
to due process was deemed fundamental,218 while the Fifth
Amendment right to a grand jury indictment was not.219 Once a
right was determined to be fundamental, it was required
regardless of any practical obstacles.220 Non-fundamental
constitutional rights, on the other hand, would only be extended
to the territories if it was not “impracticable and anomalous” to
do so.221
Although Verdugo and Boumediene did not explicitly
discuss the relevance of whether a right is fundamental,
commentators have recognized that this inquiry is implicit in
those decisions.222 In fact, both decisions cite the Insular Cases.
In Verdugo, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence points out that the
warrant requirement is not universally accepted, noting that
Mexico has “wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions,”
which indicates that he did not view the right as fundamental

216. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying
both a “fundamental rights” test and an “impractical and anomalous” test).
217. See Morrison, supra note 209, at 121 (explaining how rights within
the Constitution are determined).
218. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922) (concluding that
due process was a fundamental right that applied in the territory of Puerto
Rico, but the jury trial provisions in Article III and the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments were not fundamental and therefore did not apply); Examining
Bd. of Eng’rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976) (“It is clear now,
however, that the protections accorded by either the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment or the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment apply to residents of Puerto Rico.”).
219. See Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (“That the
requirement of an indictment by grand jury is not included within the
guaranty of ‘due process of law’ is of course well settled.”).
220. See Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 327 (discussing
the distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental rights).
221. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
also Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 328 (“[T]he principle that
emerges . . . [is] that reasonable, practical considerations could justify a
determination that a particular right is inapplicable overseas, except where
fundamental interests of the individual . . . were at stake.”).
222. See Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 329–30, 332–33
(analyzing the decisions and finding them consistent with the “‘Insular Cases’
principle that fundamental rights follow the flag”).
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in an “international sense.”223 In Boumediene, on the other
hand, Justice Kennedy stressed the “fundamental” character of
the writ of habeas corpus and its “vital” importance in protecting
against prolonged and arbitrary detention.224 Consequently,
Gerald Neuman has described the “normative valuation of the
importance of the particular right under consideration” as a
fourth factor inherent in Boumediene’s functional approach.225
Jules Lobel has proposed using international law to identify
fundamental rights applicable to the United States
government’s extraterritorial actions.226 International law
recognizes certain norms as non-derogable or jus cogens,
meaning they are binding in all situations, including during a
war or national emergency.227 These non-derogable norms
include torture, genocide, slavery, extrajudicial execution,
prolonged arbitrary detention without judicial review, and
non-refoulement, the prohibition against returning someone to
a country where they face a likelihood of persecution or
torture.228 Lobel argues that such “heinous or odious acts are
223. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278–79 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
224. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739, 743, 798 (2008).
225. Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After
Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 273, 287 (2009).
226. Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 334–43; see also Sarah
H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 225, 225–26, 281–82 (2010) (arguing that Boumediene “opened
a space for aligning U.S. domestic obligations more closely to contemporary
international legal approaches” and proposing, inter alia, using fundamental
rights as a limiting principle).
227. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (defining a jus cogens or “peremptory” norm
as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character”).
228. See Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 310 (listing the
certain basic norms of a “civilized society”); Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement
and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures that Threaten Refugee
Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 22–28 (2008) (discussing non-refoulement
as a jus cogens norm); William Thomas Worster, Contracting Out of
Non-Refoulement Protections, 27 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 81
(2017) (“Even a conservative interpretation of the principle must conclude
that, at a minimum, when the person is at risk for persecution, torture, or
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never justified by . . . practical considerations.”229 Incorporating
an examination of international fundamental rights into
Boumediene’s functional approach, Lobel contends, would
reintegrate the rationale underlying the Insular Cases but
provide a contemporary reference to international law.230
B. The Plenary Power Doctrine and Constitutional Rights
In a body of jurisprudence that developed in parallel to the
extraterritoriality cases discussed above, the Court defined the
plenary power over immigration and analyzed its impact on
constitutional rights. To date, the Supreme Court has not
addressed the interaction between these two bodies of
jurisprudence, which the Third Circuit described as possibly
“competing” constitutional fields.231 The plenary power doctrine
provides that the political branches have the sovereign power to
exclude noncitizens from the United States with very limited
judicial review.232 Although the Court initially extended the
plenary power to the expulsion or deportation of noncitizens
already in the United States,233 it has since modified its position

cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, non-refoulement is a jus cogens
obligation.”).
229. Lobel, Fundamental Norms, supra note 209, at 336.
230. Id. at 338.
231. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 434 (3d Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017).
232. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to
the government of the United States . . . cannot be granted away or restrained
on behalf of any one.”); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660
(1892) (discussing the sovereign’s right to admit noncitizens into the United
States); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950)
(same).
233. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The
right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners . . . is as absolute and unqualified
as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.”); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236 – 38 (1896) (holding that the
government could summarily expel aliens already residing within the United
States, but that it could not subject such aliens to criminal punishment on
account of their unlawful presence without due process); Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (describing the power to “expel or exclude aliens” from
the United States).
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to require certain constitutional due process protections for
noncitizens inside the country.234
There are at least two key points of tension between the
plenary power and extraterritoriality jurisprudence. First,
while the extraterritoriality approaches described in Part III.A
above reject territoriality as necessary to extend constitutional
rights to noncitizens, the plenary power cases generally rely on
physical presence in the United States as a trigger for
constitutional rights such as due process.235 Second, as an
exception to the general territoriality rule, the plenary power
cases recognize an “entry fiction” doctrine that treats certain
individuals physically present in the United States as if they
were at the border and had not entered.236 However, the scope
of the “entry fiction” doctrine regarding noncitizens in the
interior of the United States remains unclear, creating
uncertainty regarding its relevance to an extraterritoriality
analysis.237
1. Territoriality as a Trigger for Constitutional Rights
Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the political
branches’ plenary power as extending not only to decisions
about who to admit and exclude from the United States, but also
to decisions about removing noncitizens already here.238 Over
234. See Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (concluding
that an alien alleged to be in the United States illegally cannot be deported
“arbitrarily” and must be given an “opportunity to be heard”); Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596–98 (1953) (describing the protections
necessary before deporting a noncitizen); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,
32–33 (1982) (same); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212 (1953) (same); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (same); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (same).
235. See infra Part III.B.1.
236. See infra Part III.B.2.
237. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 434 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
Suspension Clause and plenary power precedent); see also HILLEL R. SMITH,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 6
(2019), https://perma.cc/TQ2P-593N (PDF) (explaining the expedited removal
process).
238. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707 (“The right of a nation to expel or
deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards
becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as
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time, however, the Supreme Court modified its position and
began extending constitutional protections to noncitizens who
had already entered the United States.
In Yamataya v. Fisher,239 the Court found that a citizen of
Japan who, according to immigration officers, had been
wrongfully admitted into the United States as someone likely to
become a public charge, was entitled to Fifth Amendment due
process protections, even though she had only been present in
the country for a few days before the authorities sought to
deport her.240 The Court explained that the Executive could not
arbitrarily . . . cause an alien who has entered the country,
and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and
a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here,
to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all
opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his
right to be and remain in the United States.241

Similarly, in Wong Wing,242 the Court found that “all persons
within the territory of the United States are entitled to the
protection” of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.243
During the Cold War Era, the Court issued additional
significant precedents addressing the plenary power doctrine
that linked constitutional rights to physical presence. In Kwong
Hai Chew,244 the Court explained that “once an alien lawfully
enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders.”245 There, the Court held that a permanent resident
returning from a five-month voyage as a crewman on a United
States merchant ship had a right to procedural due process.246
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance
into the country.”).
239. Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
240. Id. at 101–02.
241. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
242. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (concluding that
a statute that imposed a year of hard labor on Chinese noncitizens found to be
illegally present in the United States and ordered deported was
unconstitutional) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
243. Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
244. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
245. Id. at 596 n.5 (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945)
(Murphy, J., concurring)).
246. Id. at 602–03.
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Although Chew was temporarily excluded and “not permitted to
land,”247 the Court decided to “assimilate” his status “to that of
an alien continuously residing and physically present in the
United States”248 and therefore concluded that he had a right to
due process.249
In subsequent decades, the Court confirmed the importance
of territorial presence as a trigger for constitutional rights in a
number of precedents that recognized the plenary power but did
not involve challenges to immigration decisions. For example, in
Mathews,250 which involved access to federal Medicaid benefits,
the Court found that the Due Process Clause applies to everyone
“within the jurisdiction of the United States,” including those
“whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or
transitory.”251 In Zadvydas,252 the Court held that noncitizens
with final deportation orders had a liberty interest under the
Fifth Amendment that protected against unreasonably
prolonged detention.253 There, the Court acknowledged that
“certain constitutional protections available to persons inside
the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our
geographic borders,” but explained that “once an alien enters
the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process
Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”254 However, the Court has
also recognized certain exceptions to territoriality, as explained
below.
2. Exceptions to Territoriality: The “Entry Fiction” Doctrine
Other cases confirm the distinction between those who have
entered, even unlawfully, and those seeking entry, but also
247. Id. at 595.
248. Id. at 596.
249. Id.
250. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
251. Id. at 77.
252. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
253. See id. at 693 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 269 (1990); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950)) (discussing
the rights of resident alien enemies).
254. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added).
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recognize an exception called the “entry fiction” doctrine. In
Mezei,255 the Court considered the case of a permanent resident
who had lived in the United States for many years before
traveling abroad to visit his dying mother. Upon his return
twenty months later, he was detained at Ellis Island and denied
admission to the United States.256 There, the Court explained,
“aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,
may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law,”257
confirming territorial presence as a trigger for due process
protection.
However, due to the “entry fiction” doctrine, Mezei was not
treated as someone who was physically present in the United
States, despite being on Ellis Island.258 Instead, he was “treated
as if stopped at the border.”259 Consequently, the Court found
that he had no due process rights.260 Similarly, in Knauff,261 the
Court treated the German wife of a United States citizen
detained on Ellis Island as someone who had not yet entered the
United States.262 Accordingly, the Court rejected her attempt to
challenge her exclusion without a hearing, concluding that
“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”263
In deciding whether to apply the entry fiction doctrine, the
Court has, at times, considered ties to the United States. For
example, in Landon v. Plasencia,264 the majority embraced
community ties as a rationale for extending due process rights
255. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
256. See id. at 208 (explaining that Mezei was sent to Ellis Island after the
immigration inspector excluded him from the United States pursuant to the
Passport Act).
257. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
258. See id. at 215 (describing Mezei’s “temporary harborage” at Ellis
Island as “an act of legislative grace,” which provided no additional
Constitutional protections and did not change his alien status).
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. See id. at 214 (concluding that “the Attorney General may lawfully
exclude respondent without a hearing”).
261. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
262. Id. at 539–40 (noting that petitioner, though married to an Army
veteran of World War II, was detained at Ellis Island on the same day she
sought to enter the United States to be naturalized).
263. Id. at 544.
264. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
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to a permanent resident returning to the United States after
spending only a few days in Mexico.265 The Court recognized
that it had “long held that an alien seeking initial admission to
the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional
rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or
exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.”266 But “once an alien
gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that
go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes
accordingly.”267 The Court decided not to treat Plasencia as
someone seeking admission in light of her strong ties to the
United States.268 It distinguished Mezei on the basis that he had
been abroad for a much longer period of time, explaining that
“[i]f the permanent resident alien’s absence abroad is extended,
of course, he may lose his entitlement to ‘assimilat[ion of his]
status’ . . . to that of an alien continuously residing and
physically present in the United States.”269
The entry fiction doctrine has traditionally been applied to
individuals like Mezei and Knauff, who were stopped “on the
threshold of initial entry”270 and detained pending a
determination of their admissibility.271 The Supreme Court has
265. See id. at 32 (reasoning that respondent was entitled to a deportation
hearing because of her constitutional status as a “continuously present
permanent resident alien”).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
268. See id. at 23 (explaining that respondent had resided in Los Angeles
for five years as a permanent resident alien with her husband, a United States
citizen, and their minor children).
269. Id. at 33 (alteration in original) (quoting Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590, 596 (1953)).
270. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
(emphasis added).
271. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539 (noting petitioner was “detained” prior to
the Assistant Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization’s
determination); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 175
(1993) (“[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between those
aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission, such as petitioner, and
those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its
legality.” (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212)); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228,
230 – 31 (1925) (determining that an alien denied entry and initially held at
Ellis Island was, notwithstanding her subsequent transfer to the custody of
another entity while awaiting removal, “still in theory of law at the boundary
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never addressed whether the entry fiction doctrine may also be
applied to noncitizens who are already in the interior of the
country.272 Some lower courts, however, have applied the entry
fiction doctrine to noncitizens apprehended after illegally
entering the United States.273
This decision can have momentous consequences in terms
of analyzing the reach of constitutional rights. If individuals
apprehended in the interior may be treated as if they are
seeking entry, then under the plenary power cases, courts may
not be able to review decisions to remove them.274 On the other
hand, under the extraterritoriality approaches described in Part
III.A above, constitutional rights may still apply based on
application of the “substantial connections” and/or “functional”
tests. This raises questions about how the doctrines interact,
which are explored in Part IV.
IV. Analyzing Extraterritoriality in Border Enforcement
In recent years, courts have grappled with how to apply the
Court’s constitutional extraterritoriality tests and the plenary
power doctrine in the context of border enforcement. This
section examines recent federal court decisions in three types of
cases involving these issues: (1) Fourth and Fifth Amendment
challenges to cross-border shootings, which have resulted in a
circuit split; (2) Suspension Clause habeas challenges to
line and had gained no foothold in the United States” (citing Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 661 (1892))).
272. See Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (denying
certiorari of Third Circuit’s decision to apply the entry fiction doctrine to
noncitizens).
273. See infra Part IV; Castro, 835 F.3d at 445–50 (applying the entry
fiction doctrine to noncitizens apprehended after entering the United States
and subjected to expedited removal orders); see also M.S.P.C. v. U.S. Customs
& Border Prot., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1175 (D.N.M. 2014)
Petitioner, who undisputedly crossed approximately nine miles
over the border and was apprehended within 30 minutes of
crossing, does not have any substantial ties to this country to place
the nature of her rights near those of a permanent resident. Thus,
for purposes of the constitutional right to due process, Petitioner’s
status is assimilated to that of an arriving alien.
274. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543
(1950) (“[I]t is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized
by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government
to exclude a given alien.”).
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expedited removal orders, which have also resulted in a circuit
split; and (3) a procedural due process challenge to the DHS’s
practice of “metering” asylum seekers, which, at the time of this
writing, is still being litigated in district court.
A. Circuit Split on Cross-Border Shootings
Two cases arising in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits involved
cross-border shootings of Mexican teenagers by United States
Border Patrol officers standing in the United States.275 In both
cases, the families of the deceased teenagers brought Bivens
claims for damages based on violations of the boys’ Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights.276 The Fifth Circuit issued two en banc
decisions, first holding that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on
the Fifth Amendment claim (Hernández I),277 and subsequently,
after a Supreme Court remand in 2017, holding that no Bivens
remedy existed (Hernández II) and avoiding the Fourth
Amendment issue.278 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, held
in Rodriguez v. Swartz279 that the Fourth Amendment did

275. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 825 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Prado,
J., dissenting) (“[T]his case involves one federal officer ‘engaged in his law
enforcement duties’ in the United States who shot and killed an unarmed,
fifteen-year-old Mexican boy standing a few feet away.”); Rodriguez v. Swartz,
899 F.3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that the officer struck the
sixteen-year-old boy in the back).
276. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d at 815 (“The plaintiffs assert that Agent
Mesa used deadly force without justification against Sergio Hernández,
violating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . .”); Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at
727–28 (explaining that the district court treated the shooting as a “seizure”
under the Fourth Amendment but dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim).
277. See Hernández v. United States (Hernández I), 785 F.3d 117, 119–20
(5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (rejecting Fourth Amendment claim because
Hernández had no “significant voluntary connection” to the United States and
denying the officer’s qualified immunity because the asserted right was not
“clearly established”), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hernández v. Mesa,
137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
278. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d at 823 (declining to rule on the
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment and stating that
“extending Bivens would interfere with the political branches’ oversight of
national security and foreign affairs”).
279. 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018).
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apply,280 that the agent was not entitled to qualified
immunity,281 and that a Bivens remedy existed.282 The Ninth
Circuit did not reach the Fifth Amendment issue.283 Because the
Supreme Court ultimately held that there was no Bivens
remedy in a cross-border shooting, it never resolved the
underlying constitutional questions, although it did provide
some insight, at least in dicta, on the relevant extraterritoriality
tests.284 These decisions are discussed below.
1. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Hernández
Hernández v. United States285 involved a Border Patrol
agent named Jesus Mesa Jr. who shot and killed a
fifteen-year-old Mexican teenager named Sergio Adrián
Hernández Güereca (Hernández).286 At the time of the shooting,
Mesa was standing on United States soil, and Hernández was
with a group of friends in a cement culvert that separates El
Paso, Texas, from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.287 The international
boundary runs down the middle of the culvert.288 The children
were playing a game that involved running up the embankment

280. See id. at 731 (“J.A. had a Fourth Amendment right to be free from
the objectively unreasonable use of deadly force by an American agent acting
on American soil, even though Swartz’s bullets hit him in Mexico.”).
281. See id. at 734 (denying agent’s qualified immunity because the
complaint made “a persuasive case for murder charges”).
282. See id. at 748 (“[D]espite our reluctance to extend Bivens, we do so
here: no other adequate remedy is available, there is no reason to infer that
Congress deliberately chose to withhold a remedy, and the asserted special
factors either do not apply or counsel in favor of extending Bivens.”)
283. See id. at 734 (noting that if the Fifth Amendment did apply, the
agent’s conduct would fail the “shocks the conscience” test).
284. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 754 n.1 (2020); see also Swartz v.
Rodriguez, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2020 WL 981778 (Mar. 2, 2020) (mem.) (remanding
in light of the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Hernández v. Mesa).
285. 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th
Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct.
2003 (2017), reheard en banc, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 140 S. Ct.
735 (2020).
286. See id. at 255 (explaining the circumstances in which Hernández was
shot and killed).
287. Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017).
288. Id.
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on the United States side, touching the fence at the top of the
embankment, and then running back down.289
Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at
Hernández, one of which struck him in the face and killed
him.290 After investigating the incident, the Department of
Justice found that the shooting had occurred while smugglers
attempting an illegal border crossing were throwing rocks, and
it declined to bring charges against Mesa.291 Hernández’s
parents then filed a lawsuit that included a Bivens claim for
damages based on violations of Hernández’s Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights.292
In 2014, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit held that
Hernández lacked any Fourth Amendment rights, but that the
shooting violated his Fifth Amendment substantive due process
rights under the “shocks the conscience” test.293 When the Fifth
Circuit reheard the case en banc in Hernández I, it affirmed the
dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against Mesa, relying
solely on Verdugo and reasoning that Hernández was “a
Mexican citizen who had no ‘significant voluntary connection’ to
the United States” and who “was on Mexican soil at the time he
was shot.”294 However, the court was divided on whether the
Fifth Amendment applied.295 The court ultimately disposed of
the Fifth Amendment claim by concluding that even if a due

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See id. (“In the Department’s view, there was insufficient evidence
that Mesa ’acted willfully and with the deliberate and specific intent to do
something the law forbids . . . .’”).
292. Id.
293. See Hernández v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 278–79 (5th Cir. 2014)
(concluding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Agent Mesa acted
out of conscious-shocking malice or wantonness); id. at 281 (Dennis, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“I agree with the opinion of
the court in declining to apply the Fourth Amendment in adjudicating the
Appellants’ claims but I do so out of concern for pragmatic and political
questions rather than on a formal classification of the litigants involved.”); id.
at 281–82 (DeMoss, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
Hernández lacked any Fifth Amendment rights).
294. Hernández I, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)).
295. See id. at 120 (describing the court as “somewhat divided” on the Fifth
Amendment question).
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process right existed, the agent was entitled to qualified
immunity.296 The court reasoned that no case law at the time of
the incident reasonably warned Agent Mesa that “the general
prohibition of excessive force applies where the person injured
by a U.S. official standing on U.S. soil is an alien who had no
significant voluntary connection to, and was not in, the United
States when the incident occurred.”297
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the
Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in 2017.298 Describing the Fourth
Amendment issue as “sensitive” and noting that it “may have
consequences that are far reaching,”299 the Court found it
imprudent to reach that issue when its intervening decision in
Ziglar v. Abbasi300 on Bivens claims might make it
unnecessary.301 In Abbasi, which involved the detention of
terrorism suspects after the 9/11 attacks, the Court set forth a
two-part Bivens analysis that requires courts to determine if the
case presents a “new context” and if there are “special factors”
that preclude extending Bivens.302
As to the dismissal of Hernández’s Fifth Amendment claim
on qualified immunity grounds, the Supreme Court found that
the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning was erroneous because it was
undisputed “that Hernández’s nationality and the extent of his
ties to the United States were unknown to Mesa at the time of
the shooting.”303 The Court explained that “[t]he qualified
immunity analysis thus is limited to ‘the facts that were

296. See id. (applying qualified immunity because the right at issue was
not “clearly established”).
297. Id.
298. See Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017) (“The Court now
vacates the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remands for further
proceedings.”).
299. Id. at 2007.
300. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
301. See Hernández, 137 S. Ct. at 2007 (declining to resolve the Fourth
Amendment issue).
302. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859–61 (pointing to the constitutional right
at issue, the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond,
and the risk of the judiciary’s disruptive intrusion into the functioning of the
federal government’s co-equal branches as non-exclusive examples of such
“meaningful” differences).
303. Hernández, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.
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knowable to the defendant officers’ at the time they engaged in
the conduct in question.”304
The dissent by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
would have reversed the Fifth Circuit’s Fourth Amendment
holding and remanded for consideration of the Bivens and
qualified immunity questions.305 The dissent applied
Boumediene, emphasizing its focus on objective factors and
practical concerns.306 The objective factors that the dissent
highlighted were the unique features of the border area where
Hernández was shot.307
On remand, the Fifth Circuit held in Hernández II that no
Bivens remedy was available and therefore did not reach the
Fourth Amendment issue.308 It applied Abbasi and found that
the cross-border shooting presented a “new context” for a Bivens
claim and that “special factors” existed that weighed against
extending Bivens.309
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Rodriguez
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez involved similar
facts but reached the opposite conclusion.310 There, a Border
Patrol agent named Swartz was standing on United States soil
when he shot and killed a sixteen-year-old Mexican teenager
named J.A., who was walking down the Calle Internacional, a

304. Id. (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (per curiam)).
305. See id. at 2008 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that a reversal
would entail a right to bring an action for damages under Bivens).
306. See id. at 2008–09 (“[O]ur precedents make clear that ‘questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism.’” (quoting Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008))).
307. See id. at 2009 (noting that “the culvert itself has special
border-related physical features”).
308. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(explaining that an extension of Bivens would interfere with oversight of
national security and foreign affairs and declining to decide the Fourth
Amendment question).
309. See id. at 816–17 (describing the “proper inquiry” under Abbasi as
“whether ‘the case is different in any meaningful way’ from prior Bivens cases”
(quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1859 (2017))).
310. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding
that the agent violated a “clearly established constitutional right” and that
J.A.’s mother had a cause for money damages).
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street in Nogales, Mexico, that runs parallel to the border.311
Without warning or provocation, Swartz fired between fourteen
and thirty bullets across the border, through the border fence,
hitting J.A. approximately ten times.312 J.A.’s mother, Araceli
Rodriguez, sued Swartz for money damages, alleging violations
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.313
The Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment was
violated and therefore did not reach the Fifth Amendment
claim.314 The court applied Boumediene’s functional approach,
examining “[J.A.’s] citizenship and status, the location where
the shooting occurred, and any practical concerns that arise.”315
The court explained that “[n]either citizenship nor voluntary
submission to American law is a prerequisite for constitutional
rights.”316 Rather, “citizenship is just one of several
non-dispositive factors to consider.”317 Likewise, the court did
not find geographic control to be dispositive, noting that Mexico
had “both sovereignty and actual control over the street where
J.A. was hit.”318 Nevertheless, the court concluded that “J.A. had
a Fourth Amendment right to be free from the unreasonable use
of such deadly force.”319 In reaching this conclusion, the court
appeared to rely on practicalities, stressing that applying the
Fourth Amendment to this case “would simply say that
American officers must not shoot innocent, non-threatening
people for no reason.”320
The Ninth Circuit gave little weight to Verdugo’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s text, reasoning that
Justice Kennedy, who provided the crucial fifth vote in that

311. See id. at 727 (noting that J.A. was walking “peacefully” down the
street).
312. See id. (describing Calle Internacional as a “main thoroughfare lined
with commercial and residential buildings”).
313. See id. (noting J.A.’s mother was acting “both individually and as a
personal representative of J.A.’s estate”).
314. See id. at 728 (affirming the district court’s decision “to let
Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment claim proceed”).
315. Id. at 729 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008)).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 730.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 731.

EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS

805

case, had disagreed with the textual analysis.321 The court went
on to distinguish Verdugo in several ways.322 First, it stressed
that the agents in Verdugo conducted the search and seizure of
property in Mexico, whereas Swartz acted on United States
soil.323 Second, the court pointed out that the agents in Verdugo
knew they were searching a Mexican citizen’s property, whereas
Swartz could not have known J.A.’s citizenship at the time of
the shooting.324 Third, the court noted that Verdugo took into
consideration practical concerns involving warrants and
searches that did not apply in the context of a cross-border
shooting.325
Rodriguez went on to find that the use of deadly force was
unreasonable, since the government had no interest whatsoever
in shooting J.A, and that Swartz was not entitled to qualified
immunity for the Fourth Amendment violation.326 In finding
that Swartz had violated a “clearly established” constitutional
right, the key question in the qualified immunity analysis, the
court explained that Swartz did not know J.A.’s citizenship at
the time of the shooting.327 The court also extended a Bivens
remedy for damages, finding no other adequate remedy
available, no reason to infer that Congress chose to deliberately

321. See id. at 730 (noting that while the majority opinion relied on an
interpretation of “the people,” Justice Kennedy did not).
322. See id. (“[T]his case is not like Verdugo-Urquidez for several
reasons.”).
323. See id. at 731 (explaining that American law governed because
Swartz acted inside the United States).
324. See id. at 731 n.34 (comparing Boumediene, which used a detainee’s
alleged innocence as a reason to apply constitutional protections).
325. See id. at 731 (emphasizing that this incident, by contrast, occurred
on American soil).
326. See id. at 732 (noting that J.A. “was not suspected of any
crime[,] . . . was not fleeing or resisting arrest . . . [and] did not pose a threat
of harm to anyone at all”).
327. See id. at 732–33 (explaining the analysis “is limited to the facts that
were knowable to the defendant officers at the time they engaged in the
conduct in question” (quoting Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2003 (2017)
(per curiam))).
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withhold a remedy, and no special factors that weighed against
extending the Bivens remedy.328
3. The Supreme Court’s Decisions in Hernández and Rodriguez
In February 2020, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit’s en banc decision in Hernández II, holding that there
was no Bivens remedy.329 Although the Court’s opinion did not
discuss the underlying constitutional issues, it addressed the
relevant extraterritoriality test in a footnote, stating that
Verdugo “is not dispositive of the Fourth Amendment claim in
this case” because its practical concerns about a warrant being
a dead letter outside the United States did not apply.330 The
Court further stated that “it would not be ‘impractical’ or
‘anomalous’ to subject Mesa’s United States based conduct to
Fourth Amendment scrutiny,” citing Boumediene.331 Since these
issues were not directly before the Court, this footnote
constitutes dicta, but it nevertheless provides valuable insight
into the Court’s views. Shortly thereafter, the Court granted
certiorari in Rodriguez, remanding the case in light of its
decision in Hernández.332
B. The Circuit Split on Habeas Challenges to Expedited
Removal Orders
A circuit split has also emerged on the question of whether
noncitizens have a habeas right under the Suspension Clause to
challenge an expedited removal order. In Castro,333 the Third
Circuit held that a group of Honduran and Salvadoran mothers
and children who were subject to expedited removal orders could
not invoke the Suspension Clause to challenge their removal

328. See id. at 739–48 (finding that J.A.’s alternatives were inadequate,
that the case did not implicate policy, that the case did not concern national
security, and that extending Bivens would not cause problems in foreign
policy).
329. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
330. Id. at 754 n.1.
331. Id.
332. Swartz v. Rodriguez, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2020 WL 981778 (Mar. 2, 2020)
(mem.).
333. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016).
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orders.334 The Ninth Circuit, however, reached the opposite
conclusion in Thuraissigiam,335 finding that a Sri Lankan
national could invoke the Suspension Clause and obtain judicial
review of his expedited removal order through habeas corpus
proceedings.336 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Thuraissigiam’s case on October 18, 2019.337 These conflicting
decisions are discussed below.
1. The Third Circuit’s Decision in Castro
In Castro, the Third Circuit considered a case involving
twenty-eight asylum-seeking families who had received
negative credible fear determinations, followed by expedited
removal orders.338 The families argued that the statutory
constraints on judicial review of their expedited removal orders
violated the Suspension Clause.339 In addressing this question,
the Third Circuit began by expressing consternation over the
interaction between plenary power cases and extraterritoriality
cases on the reach of habeas under the Suspension Clause,
finding that these constitutional fields are “perhaps even
competing” with each other.340 The court ultimately expressed
“commitment to the full breadth” of the plenary power doctrine,
“at least as to aliens at the border seeking initial admission to
the country.”341

334. See id. at 445 (reasoning that petitioners failed to satisfy
“Boumediene’s first hurdle” because they did not prove “entitlement vel non to
the protections of the Suspension Clause”).
335. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097 (9th
Cir. 2019)
336. See id. at 1111 (disagreeing with Castro’s approach to the Suspension
Clause).
337. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 427 (2019).
338. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 425 (“[F]ollowing interviews with an asylum
officer and subsequent de novo review by an immigration judge (IJ),
Petitioners’ fear of persecution was found to be not credible, such that their
expedited removal orders became administratively final.”).
339. See id. (explaining that each family filed a habeas petition
challenging their removals as violations of the Suspension Clause).
340. See id. at 434 (noting that while petitioners relied on Suspension
Clause jurisprudence, the government urged the court to apply the plenary
power doctrine).
341. Id. at 443.
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Characterizing the families in the case as “recent
surreptitious entrants,” the court decided to apply the entry
fiction doctrine and treat them as noncitizens “seeking initial
admission to the United States.”342 This was a significant leap,
given that the petitioners were arrested after entering the
country.343 Having classified them as noncitizens seeking initial
admission, the Third Circuit then applied the Supreme Court’s
decision in Plasencia, which stated that a noncitizen seeking
initial admission to the United States “has no constitutional
rights regarding his application [for entry into the country].”344
The court therefore concluded that the petitioners’ challenge
failed under the first step of Boumediene’s analysis, which
requires determining whether the Suspension Clause applies.345
Consequently, the court did not reach the second step of the
analysis, which would require determining if the statute
provided an adequate substitute for habeas.346
Although the Third Circuit acknowledged that this
reasoning “appear[ed] to ignore” Supreme Court precedents
relating to the due process rights of noncitizens physically
present in the country, it concluded that no case had clearly held
that “arriving aliens” were entitled to due process protections.347
The court further reasoned that the petitioners’ ties to the
United States were insufficient to invoke the Suspension Clause
because they had been present in the country for only a few
hours before being apprehended by immigration officers.348
The Third Circuit revisited the issue in a subsequent case,
Osorio-Martinez,349 brought by four of the same juvenile

342. Id. at 448.
343. See id. at 427 (“[T]he vast majority [of the petitioners] were
apprehended within an hour or less of entering the country, and at distances
of less than one mile from the border . . . .”).
344. Id.; see also Landon v. Pascencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (noting that
the admission or exclusion of aliens at the border is a sovereign right).
345. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 446 (noting that a challenge to the Executive’s
decision to remove petitioners cannot rely on the Suspension Clause).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 447–48.
348. See id. at 445 (characterizing petitioners’ status as seeking initial
entry into the United States based on the amount of time they had been across
the border).
349. 893 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2018).
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petitioners from Castro two years after their initial detention.350
By that point, the children had obtained Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status, a type of legal status based on abuse, neglect,
or abandonment by at least one parent that puts children on a
path to permanent residency.351 The court found that their new
status reflected “significant ties” to the country and required
heightened protections under the statute.352 Based on these
changes, the court held that the children had a right to habeas
corpus.353 Furthermore, because the statutory restrictions on
judicial review of expedited removal orders prevented a court
from considering whether there was an “erroneous application
or interpretation of relevant law,” the court concluded that it
failed to provide “even [that] ‘uncontroversial’ baseline of
review” required by Boumediene.354
Curiously, even in this situation when the children had
obtained legal status, indicating a legal admission to the
country, the court still considered whether they should be
treated the same as someone outside the United States and held
that they had habeas rights only after applying Supreme Court
precedents addressing the extraterritorial application of
constitutional rights, including Boumediene, Verdugo, and
Eisentrager.355 Thus, even physical presence after being granted
legal status did not automatically trigger a constitutional right
to habeas corpus in the Third Circuit’s view.356 Instead, the
court went through a detailed extraterritoriality analysis.357

350. See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 893 F.3d 153 (3d
Cir. 2018) (holding that section 1252 of the INA violates the Suspension
Clause when applied to Special Immigration Juvenile (SIJ) designees).
351. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(a), (h)(1) (2018) (detailing requirements to
adjust immigration status of a nonimmigrant and additional requirements
when applied to special immigrants).
352. See Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 167 (noting that Congress
determined additional protections should be afforded to such designated
special immigrants).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 177 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008)).
355. See id. at 168 (determining that physical presence alone is
insufficient to grant constitutional protections).
356. Id.
357. See id. (relying on Castro to distinguish petitioners’ position from that
of an alien seeking entry).
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2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Thuraissigiam

In Thuraissigiam, the Ninth Circuit was confronted by the
same issue that the Third Circuit had addressed in Castro, but
applied different reasoning and reached the opposite
conclusion.358 The court found that a Sri Lankan asylum seeker
who had failed a credible fear interview and received an
expedited removal order could challenge that order through a
habeas petition.359 There, the court rejected the government’s
argument that the petitioner lacked all habeas and procedural
due process rights.360
While the Third Circuit chose the plenary power doctrine as
its starting point, the Ninth Circuit began with Boumediene’s
“analytical blueprint.”361 Since Boumediene answered the initial
question of whether the Suspension Clause applies by reference
to the common law history of the writ and its precedents, the
court followed the same approach, looking at “1789-era practice,
the finality era cases, and other relevant cases.”362 The court
found that cases from the finality era, the period between 1891
and 1952 when the immigration statute provided no judicial
review of deportation orders, established that the Supreme
Court still allowed arriving noncitizens to invoke habeas
review.363 Accordingly, the court held that Thuraissigiam could
also invoke the Suspension Clause.364 While the court
acknowledged Boumediene’s three-factor test, it found the test
to be of limited relevance and therefore applied it only in a

358. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097 (9th
Cir. 2019) (holding that section 1252 violates the Suspension Clause when the
section did not provide a meaningful opportunity for petitioner to demonstrate
that he was detained under improper application of law).
359. See id. at 1118 (finding that “meager procedural protections” provided
by the administrative process controlling fear determinations failed to meet
minimal constitutional standards).
360. See id. at 1112 (noting that “[t]he Court in Boumediene . . . explicitly
declined to link due process rights and Suspension clause rights”).
361. See id. at 1106 (“Boumediene is our starting point, even if it does not
provide a direct answer to Thuraissigiam’s challenge.”).
362. Id. at 1112.
363. See id. at 1115 (analyzing the development of habeas corpus
precedent).
364. See id. (determining that the government failed to provide
precedential support that Thuraissigiam should not be afforded rights under
the Suspension Clause).
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footnote, concluding that it supported the court’s conclusion that
habeas applied.365
The court then analyzed whether habeas review was so
limited by the INA as to effectively suspend the writ as applied
to the petitioner.366 Based on finality era precedents, the court
found that habeas review included not only legal questions, but
also mixed questions of law and fact related to removal orders.367
The court also stressed that the “meager procedural protections”
available in credible fear determinations are compounded by the
fact that the statute “prevents any judicial review of whether
DHS complied with the procedural requirements in an
individual case, or applied the correct legal standards.”368 The
court therefore concluded that this scheme did not satisfy the
“constitutional minimum” of habeas review, which requires a
court to be able to determine if there was an erroneous
interpretation or application of relevant law.369
On October 18, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to address the question of whether the INA’s limitations on
judicial review of expedited removal orders are unconstitutional
under the Suspension Clause.370 At the time of this writing, the
case is still pending with the Supreme Court.
C. The Due Process Challenge to “Metering” Asylum Seekers
The third situation raising extraterritoriality questions in
the border enforcement context involves the CBP’s “metering”
policy. In 2017, the organization Al Otro Lado and a group of
individual asylum seekers filed a lawsuit challenging
“metering” and related activities, which they describe as an
365. See id. at 1113 n.18 (“This test does not clearly fit in the present case,
given that Thuraissigiam was apprehended and detained in the United
States.”).
366. See id. at 1116 (rejecting the government’s argument that
Thuraissigiam lacked Suspension Clause protections because he lacked due
process rights).
367. See id. at 1117 (noting that habeas claims were reviewed for both
statutory and constitutional errors).
368. Id. at 1118.
369. Id.
370. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir.
2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 427 (Oct. 18, 2019) (No. 19-161). Oral argument
took place on March 2, 2020.
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illegal “Turnback Policy.”371 Some of the individual plaintiffs
were turned back after reaching United States ports of entry,
while others were turned back before reaching ports of entry
(the “extraterritorial plaintiffs”).372 The complaint made
numerous statutory claims, as well as a constitutional due
process claim.373
The government responded by filing a motion to dismiss the
lawsuit.374 Among other things, the government argued that
“metering” is a lawful policy based on the Executive’s sovereign
authority to exclude noncitizens from the country, citing a long
line of plenary power cases dating back to the Chinese Exclusion
Case.375 Relying on the same plenary power cases, as well as
Verdugo and Eisentrager, the government further argued that
“the Fifth Amendment does not apply to aliens outside the
United States, particularly where they do not allege they have
any previous voluntary connections to the United States.”376
371. See Al Otro Lado, Second Amended Complaint, supra note 52, at 80
(arguing that CBP lacks authority under the INA to turn back noncitizens who
are seeking admission to the U.S. at a point of entry).
372. See id. at 9–17 (recounting plaintiffs’ experiences of coercive practices
conducted by CBP agents resulting in plaintiffs being turned away from points
of entry).
373. See id. at 88–90 (claiming violation of the right to seek asylum under
the INA); id. at 90–93 (claiming violation of section 706(1) of the APA); id. at
93–95 (claiming violation of section 706(2) of the APA); id. at 96–97 (claiming
CPB’s violation of procedural due process by implementing the Turnback
Policy).
374. See Defendants’ Motion and Notice of Motion to Dismiss at 4, Al Otro
Lado v. Nielsen, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No.
3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC), https://perma.cc/RJ8Q-AKCZ (PDF) (arguing in
part that plaintiffs’ arguments should be dismissed as moot because plaintiffs
were afforded “the opportunity to be processed as arriving aliens”).
375. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Partially
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 11–12, Al Otro Lado, 327 F. Supp.
3d 1284 (citing United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542
(1950); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893); Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 765–67 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)), https://perma.cc/B7Y6-XQ9H (PDF)
(arguing that “[c]ontrolling the manner and pace of travel across the border”
is a sovereign prerogative).
376. See id. at 18–20 (“[O]ur rejection of extraterritorial application of the
Fifth Amendment [in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950),] was
emphatic[.]” (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269
(1990))).
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Because the extraterritorial plaintiffs had no previous,
voluntary connection to the United States, the government
concluded that they had no due process rights.377 Alternatively,
the government argued that even if procedural due process
applied to them, it only extended as far as statutory protections,
and the INA did not protect them.378
The plaintiffs responded by arguing that due process
indisputably extends at least as far as statutory rights, and that
the right to seek asylum under the INA includes noncitizens
attempting to reach a port of entry who are denied access.379
Relying on Boumediene, a case that the government’s motion
completely ignored, the plaintiffs urged that there would be
nothing “impractical or anomalous” in applying basic due
process protections at the border.380 They stressed that unlike
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency’s one-time search
of a criminal suspect’s home in Verdugo, Border Patrol agents
“routinely enforce statutes ‘pertaining to activity at or near
international borders,’” and should therefore be required to
comply with due process in enforcing those statutes.381 In
making this argument, the plaintiffs stressed the legislative
constraints on plenary power.382 What would be impractical and
anomalous, the plaintiffs concluded, is to “deny asylum seekers
due process rights because Defendants intentionally intercept
them just shy of the border in an attempt to manipulate the
Constitution’s reach.”383
377. Id. at 21.
378. Id. at 21–22.
379. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at
23–24, Al Otro Lado, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC),
https://perma.cc/36E8-LB8Y (PDF) (arguing that plaintiffs are afforded
“statutorily-created liberty interests” when attempting to cross the border at
a point of entry).
380. Id. at 24–25.
381. Id. at 25 (quoting United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 199 (5th
Cir. 2005)).
382. See id. (“Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims rest squarely within the
Supreme Court’s longstanding command that ‘[i]n the enforcement of
[Congress’s] policies [pertaining to the entry of aliens], the Executive
Branch . . . must respect the procedural safeguards of due process.’” (citing
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 754, 766–67 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522, 531 (1954))).
383. Id. at 26 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008)).
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In its reply brief, the government finally addressed
Boumediene, interpreting it narrowly as holding only that the
Suspension Clause applies to Guantánamo Bay detainees.384
The government stressed that Boumediene’s holding “turned on
the writ’s unique role in the separation of powers,” implying that
due process rights do not play such a role in separation of
powers.385 It urged the court to rely on “pre-Boumediene law
holding that the Due Process Clause does not extend to aliens
without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the
United States.”386 Alternatively, the government argued that it
should prevail even under Boumediene’s impractical and
anomalous test, as the plaintiffs are noncitizens, the United
States does not have de jure or de facto sovereignty over
Mexican border towns, and extending the Fifth Amendment to
Mexican territory would cause friction with Mexico’s
government.387
On July 29, 2019, the U.S. District Court issued a order
granting in part and denying in part the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.388 On the due process issue, the court agreed with the
plaintiffs, rejecting the government’s territorial argument based
on Eisentrager and applying Boumediene, which it found
“squarely
rejected
bright-line
rules
regarding
the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution.”389 The court
also rejected the government’s argument, based on Verdugo,
that a significant voluntary connection to the United States is
required to trigger due process rights.390 Relying on the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez, the court reasoned that
384. See Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Partially Dismissed
Second Amended Complaint at 13, Al Otro Lado, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (No.
3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC), https://perma.cc/6ZJW-4RLX (PDF) (“Boumediene
held only that the Suspension Clause ‘has full effect at Guantanamo Bay’ in
the specific context of law-of-war detainees who had been detained there for
years.” (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008))).
385. Id. (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 737, 743, 746 (2008)).
386. Id.
387. See id. at 14–15 (arguing that the extraterritorial concerns raised in
Boumediene apply to noncitizens presenting themselves at the border in order
to seek asylum).
388. Al Otro Lado, Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 55.
389. Id. at 70–71.
390. See id. at 71–73 (relying on Rodriguez to dismiss defendants’
arguments that Verdugo precludes application of constitutional rights at the
border).
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connections do “not alone control the question of constitutional
protection for aliens, particularly when the challenged conduct
concerns the conduct of U.S. officers acting on U.S. soil.”391
Since the metering policy was allegedly developed by
high-level federal officials in the United States, and applied in
individual cases by CBP officers on United States soil, the court
found nothing impractical or anomalous about applying due
process protections.392 Regarding practical necessities, the court
stressed that “[t]he lesson of Boumediene is that the political
branches do not enjoy the prerogative to ‘switch the
Constitution on or off at will.’”393 Because Congress had created
certain statutory procedures to protect asylum seekers,
including “arriving aliens,” and the defendants allegedly
impeded access to this procedure, the court found that practical
necessities warranted application of the due process clause.394
V. Disparities in Determining the Reach of Constitutional
Rights
The decisions discussed above reflect disparities and
conflicts in several key areas. This Part examines differences in
the courts’ selection and application of the Supreme Court’s
extraterritoriality tests, their approaches to interpreting the
interaction between those tests and the plenary power doctrine,
and their use of separation of powers principles as a structural
constraint,
including
the
role
of
Boumediene’s
anti-manipulation principle.
A. Selection and Application of Extraterritoriality Tests
The decisions discussed above raise many questions about
the extraterritoriality tests: Which test or tests should the court
apply? Does the test depend on the constitutional right at issue?
Do later tests modify or displace earlier ones? Is a given test
applied the same way in all situations? These questions, and
391. Id. at 74.
392. See id. at 74–75 (demonstrating that the allegations do not raise
extraterritorial application concerns).
393. Id. at 76 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008)).
394. See id. at 76 (arguing that CPB agents may not contravene their
obligations in extending asylum protections).
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disparities in how courts have answered them, are examined
below.
1. Which Extraterritoriality Test(s) Apply?
Courts are clearly conflicted about which extraterritoriality
tests to apply under what circumstances. Even before the border
enforcement cases discussed above, courts followed different
approaches. In cases pre-dating Boumediene, some courts
applied the “substantial connections” test to other constitutional
rights.395 After Boumediene was decided, some courts have
continued to rely exclusively on Verdugo’s substantial
connections test,396 while others have relied solely on
Boumediene’s functional approach.397 Courts also frequently
combine these tests, effectively treating “substantial
connections” as a fourth factor that is added to the three-factor
test in Boumediene.398 In Ibrahim,399 for instance, the Ninth
Circuit applied both Verdugo’s “substantial connections” test
and Boumediene’s “functional” test in analyzing whether a
Malaysian citizen could invoke the protections of the Fifth and
First Amendments in challenging her inclusion on the “no-fly
list.”400 In that case, the plaintiff had spent years studying at
Stanford University before leaving the United States to speak
395. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d
192, 201–02 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying Verdugo in holding that a foreign
organization with property in the United States was entitled to a due process
hearing before the Secretary of State may classify it as a “foreign terrorist
organization”); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991) (relying on
Verdugo in holding that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause should
be applied extraterritorially to government funding of religious schools
abroad); Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 915–17 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pre-dating
Verdugo but citing Reid in holding that a Colombian national outside the
United States was entitled to assert a due process claim against the United
States government based on seizure of her Swiss bank account).
396. See, e.g., United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir.
2009) (“Aliens do enjoy certain constitutional rights, but not the protection of
the Fourth Amendment if they have ‘no previous significant voluntary
connection with the United States . . . .’” (quoting United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990))).
397. See, e.g., supra notes 314–320 and accompanying text.
398. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997
(9th Cir. 2012) (characterizing a “significant voluntary connection” to the
United States).
399. 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012).
400. Id.
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at a conference abroad that was sponsored by Stanford.401 Based
on both tests, the Court concluded that Ibrahim had Fifth and
First Amendment rights.402
Similar inconsistencies in selecting and applying
extraterritoriality tests emerge from the border enforcement
cases examined above. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Hernández I treated Verdugo’s substantial connections test as
controlling on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.403
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez, on the other hand,
discussed both Verdugo and Boumediene in analyzing the
Fourth Amendment claim, relying primarily on the latter
because it found Verdugo’s substantial connections test to be of
limited relevance in a case involving a United States border
patrol agent acting on United States soil.404 This reflects a
broader problem, namely that the very “concept of
extraterritoriality becomes less straightforward as events
straddle borders.”405
While the Supreme Court’s majority decision in
Hernández I did not address which test(s) apply in analyzing the
Fourth Amendment claim, the dissenting opinion by Justice
Breyer and Justice Ginsburg applied Boumediene and discussed
Verdugo only in terms of its consideration of practical
concerns.406 Yet, the dissent then concluded that the culvert
area where the shooting occurred had “sufficient involvement
with, and connection to, the United States” for the Fourth
Amendment to apply, which invoked Verdugo’s substantial
401. Id. at 988.
402. Id. at 997. Significantly, the court found that activities abroad can
also contribute to forming sufficient connections with the United States. Id.
403. See Hernández I, 785 F.3d 117, 124 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (finding
that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo supports the “substantial
connections” test).
404. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 731 (9th Cir. 2018)
(determining that the “practical concerns” raised by Verdugo in applying the
Fourth Amendment are not present when circumstances involve domestic
conduct).
405. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 341, 352 (2014) (describing a cross-border shooting as a “classic
example” of this problem).
406. See Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2010 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the application of the Fourth Amendment would
avoid anomalies).
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connections test, suggesting that it may still be relevant.407 The
Supreme Court’s most recent decision in Hernández II, on the
other hand, makes no mention of connections of any kind in its
dicta addressing the relevant test, suggesting that focusing on
practicalities is what is critical.408 Looking at these decisions
together, it appears that the Court does not view Verdugo as
dispositive of all Fourth Amendment claims and that
Boumediene’s functional approach extends to that context.
Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Hernández I indicated that the court came to no
consensus regarding the appropriate test and therefore simply
avoided reaching the merits of that issue.409 Judge Jones’s
concurrence reasoned that the Fifth Amendment claim was just
as thwarted by Eisentrager as the Fourth Amendment claim
was by Verdugo.410 She interpreted Eisentrager as holding that
“aliens outside the sovereign territory of the United States are
not entitled to Fifth Amendment rights” and concluded that the
court was “not at liberty to ‘underrule’ Supreme Court decisions
when the Court has explicitly failed to overrule its own
precedents.”411 Accordingly, she rejected the argument that
Boumediene effectively overruled Eisentrager.412
Judge Prado’s concurrence, on the other hand, found Judge
Jones’s opinion to be an “oversimplified and flawed analysis of
the
Fifth Amendment
and
the Supreme Court’s
extraterritoriality precedents” that “sacrifices nuance for an
unwarranted sense of certainty.”413 He would have applied
Boumediene, which he described as a “watershed opinion” that
“not only authoritatively interpreted these earlier cases but also
announced the bedrock standards for determining the
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution—not just the writ of
habeas corpus.”414 Based on Boumediene’s three-factor test,
407. Id. at 2011.
408. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 754 n.1 (2020).
409. See Hernández I, 785 F.3d at 121 (noting that the Court in
Boumediene “expressly limited its holding to the facts before it”).
410. Id. at 126 (Jones, J., concurring).
411. Id.
412. See id. (focusing on Boumediene’s express holding in rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that Eisentrager was “de facto overruled” by Boumediene’s
three-part test).
413. Id. at 134 (Prado, J., concurring).
414. Id. at 136.
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Judge Prado would have concluded that the Fifth Amendment
applies had the court reached the merits of that issue.415 “To
hold otherwise,” he explained, “would enshrine an
unsustainably strict, territorial approach to constitutional
rights—one the Supreme Court rejected in Boumediene.”416
In the expedited removal cases, the Ninth Circuit relied on
Boumediene. Although, as in Rodriguez, a major part of the
action (the petitioner’s apprehension and detention) had
occurred in the United States, Thuraissigiam did not rely on
that fact in resisting Verdugo’s substantial connections test.417
The Third Circuit’s decision in Castro mentioned both
Boumediene and Verdugo, but focused mainly on Plasencia, a
plenary power case that, like Verdugo, emphasized ties to the
United States.418 Both Verdugo and Plasencia supported the
court’s conclusion that physical presence alone, especially of
short duration, did not trigger constitutional protections.419
The Third Circuit’s subsequent decision in Osorio-Martinez,
which involved some of the same child petitioners from Castro
after they had obtained Special Immigrant Juvenile Status,
confirmed the court’s reliance on Verdugo in Castro.420 However,
in Osorio-Martinez, the court went through Boumediene’s
habeas analysis after concluding that the children had
developed sufficient ties to the United States based on their new
legal status.421
In the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in
Thuraissigiam, both parties relied heavily on Boumediene. The
415. See id. at 138 (arguing that the Boumediene factors and Fifth
Amendment analysis “militate in favor of the extraterritorial application of
substantive due process” rights).
416. Id.
417. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097,
1115 (9th Cir. 2019) (relying on “finality era” precedent to inform
Boumediene’s step one analysis).
418. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 448 (3d Cir.
2016).
419. See id. at 448–50, 448 n.30 (finding that physical presence should
nevertheless be considered alongside substantial ties when making
determinations of constitutional rights).
420. See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 168
(3d Cir. 2018) (reviewing the significance of Verdugo’s “substantial
connections” test in establishing entitlement to constitutional protections).
421. Id. at 167–78.
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government also urged a meaningful ties test, relying on
Plasencia and citing Verdugo.422 Thuraissigiam countered that
Boumediene recognized habeas rights for enemy combatants
with no ties to the United States and that Verdugo did not apply,
stressing that the case took place wholly on United States
soil.423
In Al Otro Lado, the “metering” case, the government and
plaintiffs sharply disputed which test applied.424 The district
court concluded that Verdugo’s substantial connections test was
not controlling because part of the action involved CBP officers
on United States soil, relying on the reasoning of Rodriguez.425
Therefore, the court focused on Boumediene, noting its
repudiation of Eisentrager’s territory-based due process
analysis.426 In cases like this, where some critical part of the
action occurred in the United States, there may be overlap
between Verdugo’s substantial connection test and
Boumediene’s nature-of-the site factor, but neither Al Otro Lado
nor any of the other decisions mentioned above discussed or
explored this possibility.
Given these inconsistencies in selecting a test, even when
dealing with very similar factual and legal questions, it is not
surprising that circuit splits have emerged.427 Clearly, more
guidance is needed from the Supreme Court. In the meantime,
the Court’s recent dicta in Hernández rejects the notion of a
one-to-one correspondence between a specific precedent and a
particular constitutional right, reinforcing the importance of
Boumediene’s practical approach outside the habeas context.

422. Brief for the United States, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
No. 19-161 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2020), 2019 WL 6727092 at *25 (Dec. 9, 2019).
423. Brief of Respondent Vijaykumar Thuraissigiam in Opposition, Dep’t
of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, No. 19-161 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2020),
2020 WL 353476 at *43, 43 n.18 (Jan. 15, 2020).
424. See supra Part IV.C.
425. See Al Otro Lado, Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 55, at
72 – 73 (rejecting defendants’ argument that Verdugo’s “previous voluntary
significant connection” test effectively limits Fourth Amendment protections
for noncitizens).
426. See id. at 74 (reasoning that application of Eisentrager’s “bright-line
rule” would be in contravention of Boumediene’s constitutional analysis).
427. See supra Part IV.
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2. How Should the Tests Be Applied?
The border enforcement cases also show disparate ways of
applying both the substantial connections test and the
functional test. One of the main disputes regarding Verdugo is
whether or how to apply the substantial connections test in
cases in which a significant part of the action occurred in the
United States.428 Does that fact alone create a significant
connection? If the connection involved a United States agent
acting inside the country, should the court still examine the
noncitizen’s connections to the United States? In Rodriguez and
Al Otro Lado, it was not completely clear whether the Border
Patrol agents’ connections to the United States satisfied the
substantial connections test or simply rendered it irrelevant.
One reason for doubting the relevance of the substantial
connections test when a significant part of the alleged
constitutional violation occurs inside the United States is
because of how the Supreme Court framed the issue in Verdugo.
There, the Court characterized the case as concerning “whether
the Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by
United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident
alien and located in a foreign country.”429 The Court stressed
that “if there was a constitutional violation, it occurred solely in
Mexico.”430 Consequently, some courts have refused to apply
Verdugo to situations where noncitizens alleged Fourth
Amendment violations that occurred in the United States.431 For
example, some courts have found Verdugo irrelevant to an
undocumented immigrant’s motion to exclude evidence

428. See D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law:
Undocumented Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85,
107–08 (2011) (noting how courts have treated similar connections with
varying degrees of significance when applying Verdugo).
429. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
430. Id. at 264.
431. See Núñez, supra note 428, at 103–04 (explaining how Verdugo
invites courts to limit its holding to violations that occurred outside the United
States and treat it as irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment rights of
noncitizens within the country).
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allegedly obtained from an illegal search that took place in the
United States.432
Because Rodriguez and Al Otro Lado did not clearly address
whether the substantial connections test was satisfied, they
leave many questions unanswered about how to apply the test
that could be relevant to future cases. For example, had the
court in Al Otro Lado chosen to examine the asylum seekers’
relationship to the United States, it may have found factors
supporting a connection based on their compliance with CBP’s
“metering” rules and efforts to follow United States immigration
laws. In Martinez–Aguero,433 the Fifth Circuit found that
“regular and lawful entry of the United States pursuant to a
valid border-crossing card and . . . acquiescence in the U.S.
system of immigration constitute[d] voluntary acceptance of
societal obligations, rising to the level of ‘substantial
connections.’”434 Similarly, asylum seekers subjected to
“metering” could argue that they acquiesced to the United
States system.435 The analogy to Martinez-Aguero would be even
stronger in a case involving a constitutional challenge to the
“Remain in Mexico” policy, where asylum seekers are in United
States removal proceedings and allowed regular entry for their
court hearings.
The border enforcement cases discussed above also took
different approaches with respect to Boumediene’s three-factor
432. See id. at 104 (noting that the “substantial connection” test under
Verdugo has been rejected by courts in their determination of Fourth
Amendment application); see also United States v. Iribe, 806 F. Supp. 917, 919
(D. Colo. 1992) (rejecting the government’s argument that Verdugo’s holding
precludes affording Fourth Amendment protections to persons considered to
be “excludable alien[s]”), rev’d in part on other grounds, aff’d in part, 11 F.3d
1553 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 916 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (“[T]he Court is disinclined to impose a greater burden on [illegal
immigrants] as a prerequisite to seeking the shelter of the Fourth
Amendment.”), rev’d on other grounds, No. CR-96-40075-SBA, 1999 WL
1128650 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1999). But cf. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d
618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (declining to decide whether Verdugo’s substantial
connections test applied but finding that the test was nevertheless satisfied by
the noncitizen’s prior entries and good faith efforts to comply with United
States immigration laws).
433. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006).
434. Id. at 625 (emphasis added).
435. See id. (finding that Martinez-Aguero’s “periodic visits to assist her
aunt with retrieving her Social Security check” were “sufficient to confer
Fourth Amendment rights”).
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test. In Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Fourth
Amendment applied based on the three-factor test.436 In
discussing the first Boumediene factor, the Ninth Circuit
stressed that the agent did not know the victim’s citizenship,
whereas the Fifth Circuit did not attach any significance to that
fact in Hernández I.437 The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion, however,
appeared to be based primarily on the third factor related to
practicalities, as the court found that it would not be impractical
to apply the Fourth Amendment in a situation where a United
States agent standing on United States soil used lethal force.438
Similarly, in Al Otro Lado, the plaintiffs’ argument and the
district court’s decision focused on the “impractical and
anomalous” part of Boumediene’s test, rather than the other
factors, suggesting that some courts may view this as the heart
of the “functional” test.439 In fact, the court did not mention the
three-factor test or discuss factors other than practicality at
all.440 A more detailed analysis of the factors, especially the first
factor pertaining to status and the adequacy of the process
through which a status determination is made, could have
supported the court’s conclusion. Asylum seekers have a special
status under domestic and international law that distinguishes
them from other civilian migrants.441 Furthermore, the
inadequacy of the procedures that culminate in asylum status
436. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 729–32 (9th Cir. 2018).
437. See id. at 733 (finding that decedent’s citizenship was irrelevant in
determining whether use of deadly force was constitutionally justified);
Hernández I, 785 F.3d 117, 137–38 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (showing that the
question of citizenship only arose in Judge Prado’s concurrence explicating the
Boumediene three-factor test)
438. See Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 748 (contrasting circumstances to a
hypothetical situation in which an officer used lethal force while fully across
the border).
439. See Al Otro Lado, Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 55, at 71,
74 (noting plaintiffs are not asking for extraterritorial application of due
process rights).
440. See Al Otro Lado v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1220 (S.D. Cal.
2019) (discussing practicality in lieu of detailed three-factor analysis).
441. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a) (2018) (defining “refugee” and
permitting aliens to seek asylum); Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (establishing
international law for status of refugees); Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 (amending
Convention to recognize more refugees).
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determinations, including the “metering” process itself and all
of the problems related to waitlists discussed in Part II above,
are relevant to the first factor, but were not discussed by the
court.442
While the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thuraissigiam also
relied heavily on Boumediene, it, too, paid little attention to
Boumediene’s three-factor test, applying it only in a footnote.443
There, the court reasoned that those factors “[did] not map
precisely onto this case because Thuraissigiam was
apprehended and . . . detained on U.S. soil.”444 As Gerald
Neuman has noted, the three-factor test is nonexclusive and
“was tailored to the Suspension Clause and its case law, and
would presumably need modification to address other rights.”445
But Thuraissigiam is a Suspension Clause case, suggesting that
such tailoring may be necessary even when addressing the same
constitutional right in a new context.446 The court’s analysis of
the first factor stressed the poor procedural protections in
credible fear determinations.447 Oddly, the court’s analysis of
the second factor concluded that the nature of the site “weighed
strongly” in the petitioner’s favor because he was apprehended
and detained in the United States, even though the court had
previously stated that this exact fact rendered the three-factor
test less relevant to the case.448
An interesting gap is that none of the border enforcement
decisions paid much attention to the history, geography, and
control of the border region in discussing the “nature of the site”
factor.449 Judge Prado’s initial decision in Hernández, prior to
442. See Al Otro Lado, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1220 (omitting analysis of
procedural inadequacies).
443. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1113
n.18 (9th Cir. 2019).
444. Id. at 1108.
445. Neuman, supra note 225, at 287.
446. See Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1104–12 (discussing the Suspension
Clause).
447. See id. at 1113 n.18 (“[H]allmarks of the adversarial process are
lacking.”).
448. See id. (distinguishing Boumediene because of extraterritoriality, but
then finding that detention in United States “weighs strongly” for second
factor analysis).
449. See Eva L. Bitran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution
and Foreign Nationals on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
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rehearing en banc, provided the most detailed analysis of the
border region itself.450 Judge Prado reasoned that even though
the United States did not exercise de jure or de facto sovereignty
over the Mexican side of the border, “the heavy presence and
regular activity of federal agents across a permanent border
without any shared accountability weigh in favor of recognizing
some constitutional reach.”451 He noted that border patrol
agents “act on or occasionally even across the border they
protect,”452 and recognized that border protection policies
“expand U.S. control beyond the nation’s territorial borders,”
such as the “pre-inspection” examinations that CBP conducts in
foreign countries and at sea.453
Judge Prado’s decision also raised two other relevant
considerations in assessing the nature of a site. First, he
brought up the duration of United States involvement in the
location, noting the “long history of United States involvement
beyond the U.S.-Mexico border.”454 He contrasted the United
States government’s transient control over the Landsberg
Prison in Eisentrager with the role of Border Patrol agents,
whom he described as “repeat players in a ‘constant’ border
relationship.”455 Second, he raised the issue of accountability to
the authority in control of the site. He again distinguished
Eisentrager, where the Landsberg jailers were accountable to
Allied authorities, from the border region, where United States
border patrol agents are not accountable to the Mexican
government.456 Neither of the Fifth Circuit’s subsequent

229, 244–47 (2014) (discussing the nature of the site by providing a historical
perspective of United States action in the border region).
450. See Hernández v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 270 (5th Cir. 2014).
451. Hernández, 757 F.3d at 270.
452. Id. at 269.
453. Id. at 270 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 235.5(b) (2019); Ayelet Shachar, The
Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 165, 174–77
(2007)).
454. Id. (citing Bitran, supra note 449, at 244–47).
455. Id. at 270 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 768–69 (2008)).
456. Id.
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decisions in Hernández I and Hernández II analyzed the border
region in such detail.457
3. Does the Nature of the Right Matter?
The decisions discussed above also reflect confusion about
whether a precedent pertaining to one constitutional right may
be applied to another right. For example, in Hernández II, Judge
Jones thought Verdugo controlled the Fourth Amendment issue,
Eisentrager controlled the Fifth Amendment due process issue,
and Boumediene was irrelevant because it involved the right to
habeas corpus.458 This perspective represents one extreme, with
a single precedent mapping onto a specific right. Other judges
have shown much greater flexibility in applying the various
tests to different rights and have treated Eisentrager as
effectively overruled by the later cases.459
A helpful way to understand these decisions is to examine
more generally whether the court considered the fundamental
nature of a right. As explained in Part III, one of the Supreme
Court’s early approaches to extraterritoriality involved
extending only constitutional rights deemed “fundamental” to
unincorporated territories, and commentators have observed
that both Verdugo and Boumediene implicitly considered
whether the right at issue was fundamental.460 Some of the
border enforcement decisions discussed above also implicitly or
explicitly considered a right’s fundamental nature, which helps
explain the circuit splits.461 The cases that explored the
fundamental nature of the right at issue came out in the

457. Compare id. (offering detailed discussion of border region), with
Hernández I, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), and Hernández II,
885 F.3d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (lacking similar analysis).
458. See Hernández I, 785 F.3d at 122–28 (Jones, J., concurring) (rejecting
argument that Boumediene effectively overruled Eisentrager).
459. See id. at 136 (Prado, J., concurring) (criticizing Judge Jones’s
“uncomplicated view of extraterritoriality”).
460. See Neuman, supra note 225, at 286 (noting Justice Kennedy’s view
on the Suspension Clause rights of foreign nationals in United States custody);
Lobel, supra note 209, at 335 (claiming that Boumediene “relied heavily on
fundamental rights principles”); Baher Azmy, Executive Detention,
Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 466
(2010) (discussing analysis from Verdugo and Boumediene).
461. See, e.g., Hernández I, 785 F.3d at 119–21 (majority opinion) (omitting
mention of the nature of the right at issue).

EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS

827

noncitizens’ favor, while those that did not refused to extend
constitutional protections.462
In Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit implicitly considered the
fundamental nature of a right against summary execution,
while the Fifth Circuit’s decisions in Hernández did not.463 In
finding that Border Patrol Agent Swartz was not entitled to
qualified immunity, the Rodriguez court reasoned that anyone
would know that a “gratuitous” killing committed “for no
reason” is unlawful “without a judicial decision to tell him so,”
and called it an “obvious case” of excessive force.464
Furthermore, although the court did not analyze the Fifth
Amendment substantive due process claim, it stated in dicta
that Swartz’s conduct would fail the “shocks the conscience”
test, because the “cold-blooded murder of an innocent person
walking down the street in Mexico or Canada” would shock the
conscience of “anyone.”465 These remarks invoke the prohibition
against extrajudicial killing, which is a non-derogable norm of
international law.466
The Fifth Circuit’s majority decisions in Hernández I and
Hernández II, on the other hand, did not refer, even implicitly,
to fundamental rights, even though the case also involved a
summary execution.467 However, Judge Prado’s dissent in
Hernández II explained that he “would not so readily abdicate
our judicial role given the fundamental rights at stake here.”468
462. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 748 (9th Cir. 2018) (permitting
Bivens claim by noncitizen); Hernández I, 785 F.3d at 119–21 (denying
noncitizen Bivens claim).
463. Compare Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 733 (asking “whether it was clearly
established that it was unconstitutional . . . to use deadly force without
justification against a person of unknown nationality on the other side of the
border”), with Hernández I, 785 F.3d at 119–21 (lacking discussion of
extrajudicial killing).
464. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 733–34.
465. Id. at 734.
466. See Lobel, supra note 209, at 310 (recognizing prohibitions on
extrajudicial execution to be “so fundamental as to be non-derogable under
any circumstances”).
467. See Hernández I, 785 F.3d 117, 119–21 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc);
Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 814–23 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (lacking
consideration of the nature of rights).
468. Hernández II, 885 F.3d at 829 (Prado, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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Similarly, in the expedited removal cases, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Thuraissigiam considered the fundamental
nature of habeas.469 The court quoted Boumediene’s description
of habeas as a “fundamental” right and emphasized its historical
importance.470 It also found that plenary power concerns could
not “overwhelm the ‘fundamental procedural protections of
habeas corpus . . . a right of first importance.’”471 This approach
recognizes that the Great Writ protects the fundamental right
against prolonged detention without judicial review, which is
also a non-derogable norm under international law.472
By contrast, the Third Circuit’s decision in Castro did not
discuss the fundamental nature of habeas review at all.473
Approaching the case from a plenary power perspective and
applying precedents involving due process clouded the
centrality of the petitioners’ habeas claim. In fact, the court
repeatedly referred to the plenary power to exclude as a
“fundamental sovereign attribute,” without once describing
habeas as a fundamental right.474 Although the court recognized
the fundamental nature of due process in quoting cases such as
Yamataya, it construed Yamataya narrowly as excluding “very
recent clandestine entrants.”475
Furthermore, the district court’s decision in Al Otro Lado
explicitly discussed non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm,
thereby recognizing its status as a fundamental right under
international law.476 As part of their claim under the ATS, the
plaintiffs specifically asserted that CBP’s denial or delays in
giving noncitizens access to the asylum process violated the jus
469. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097,
1113 – 15, 1119 (9th Cir. 2019).
470. Id.
471. Id. at 1119 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008)).
472. See Lobel, supra note 209, at 310 (listing prohibitions against
prolonged arbitrary detention without judicial review as another
non-derogable norm in international law).
473. See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 424–50 (3d
Cir. 2016) (omitting discussion of nature of habeas rights).
474. See id. at 439, 444 (describing the plenary power to exclude
noncitizens as a “fundamental sovereign attribute”).
475. Id. at 442 n.21.
476. See Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1224 (S.D.
Cal. 2019) (“Defendants simply fail to grapple with Plaintiffs’ allegations or
arguments on whether non-refoulement is a norm that is recognized by the law
of nations.”).
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cogens norm of non-refoulement.477 Because the government did
not address this contention, the court found that it had conceded
that violation of non-refoulement is an actionable claim.478
Although the due process claim was distinct from the ATS claim,
the core of the violation for both causes of action is deprivation
of access to an asylum process designed to protect the
fundamental right of non-refoulement. Nevertheless, it is
interesting that the court did not acknowledge the fundamental
nature of due process, which has been recognized for the past
century.479
In short, these cases suggest that consideration of whether
a right is fundamental, even implicitly, has the power to shape
a court’s extraterritoriality analysis and potentially influence
the outcome.
4. Proposal for a Composite Test
One approach that would help address the questions raised
above, provide some normative guidance, and be firmly rooted
in precedents is a composite test that combines key aspects of
the substantial connections, functionary, and fundamental
rights approaches in a generally applicable and adaptable
manner.480 This composite test would involve considering: (1)
the citizenship and status of the individual alleging a
constitutional violation and the adequacy of the process through
477. See id. at 1222 (outlining ATS claims); see also Alien Tort Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2018) (offering civil remedy for torts committed in violation of
international law).
478. See Al Otro Lado, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1224 n.14 (explaining denial of
motion to dismiss).
479. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922) (distinguishing
the right to a jury trial from “certain fundamental personal rights declared in
the Constitution, as for instance that no person could be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process”).
480. Shawn Fields has also suggested the possibility of a test that
combines the Boumediene factors with other factors, but ultimately proposes
a “unified theory of constitutional extraterritoriality” that involves (1)
universal extraterritorial application of fundamental constitutional equality
norms; and (2) extraterritorial application of fundamental substantive liberty
interests and procedural due process interests, both of which would be
moderated by foreign policy and other practical considerations. Shawn E.
Fields, From Guantanamo to Syria: The Extraterritorial Constitution in the
Age of “Extreme Vetting,” 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1123, 1174–89 (2018).
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which that status determination was made or is being made; (2)
the nature of the site where the alleged constitutional violation
occurred, including the level of United States government
involvement in the site; (3) the practical obstacles inherent in
recognizing the constitutional right; (4) the degree of
connections that the person alleging the violations, or the
violation itself, has to the United States; and (5) the
fundamental nature of the right at issue.
The first three factors are simply more generalized
statements of the Boumediene factors. The first factor would
allow consideration of immigration status, including whether
someone is an asylum seeker, as well as the adequacy of the
process for seeking that status. This would allow courts to take
into consideration, for example, any concerns about the
processes of “metering,” “Remain in Mexico,” and expedited
removal, through which status determinations are made.
The second factor regarding the nature of the site explicitly
mentions considering the level of United States involvement in
the site to emphasize that this factor is not limited to examining
whether there is de facto or de jure control. Thus, the level of
United States involvement in the U.S.-Mexico border region,
which both Justice Breyer and Judge Prado highlighted in their
respective dissents,481 would be considered under the second
factor.
The third factor reflects the practical concerns significant
to both Boumediene and Verdugo. This factor may deserve
special weight because it goes to the heart of those decisions and
contemplates the unique circumstances of each case.
The fourth factor captures Verdugo’s focus on connections
to the United States but takes a broader perspective, allowing
consideration of not only the individual’s connections but also
any connections that the alleged violation itself may have to this
country. This would include where the alleged violation occurred
and who committed the violation, which would help evaluate

481. See Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2010 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“The United States and Mexico have jointly agreed to maintain
the Rio Grande and jointly to maintain the ‘limitrophe’ areas.” (citing Treaty
to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and
Colorado River as the International Boundary art. IV, Nov. 23, 1970, 23 U.S.T.
390)); Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 828 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Prado, J.,
dissenting).
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incidents where part or all of the action occurred on United
States soil.
Finally, the fifth factor would make explicit the
consideration about fundamental rights that is implicit in
Boumediene and Verdugo and that appears to influence the
border enforcement cases discussed above.
Alternatively, if courts did not want to add more factors to
the Boumediene framework, they could simply take Verdugo
into account by interpreting the first factor’s reference to a
person’s status to incorporate, inter alia, the degree of
connection to the United States. Courts could also account for
the connections that the alleged violation had to the United
States under Boumediene’s second factor regarding the nature
of the site, instead of considering it as part of the proposed
fourth factor. Thus, if part of the violation occurred on United
States soil, that would be considered as part of the nature of the
site. This alternative approach would allow courts to stick more
closely to the Boumediene test while still facilitating its
application to a broader array of situations, including in the
border enforcement context.
B. The Role of Plenary Power
The border enforcement cases discussed above also reflect
disparate and conflicting interpretations of the relationship
between the plenary power doctrine and the Supreme Court’s
constitutional extraterritoriality jurisprudence. At least three
different approaches emerge from these decisions. First, courts
may treat one doctrine as trumping the other. Second, courts
may be influenced by the plenary power as an implicit deference
doctrine, even if they do not discuss it explicitly. Third, courts
may stress the legislative constraints on the plenary power in
order to avoid competing constitutional outcomes. Each of these
approaches is discussed further below.
1. Plenary Power as a Trump Card
In the expedited removal cases, the Third and Ninth Circuit
sharply disagreed about the relevance of the plenary power. The
Third Circuit’s analysis in Castro started and ended with the

832

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751 (2020)

plenary power doctrine.482 Once the court decided to apply the
“entry fiction” rationale to individuals in expedited removal
proceedings who had been apprehended after entering the
United States, treating them as if they were outside seeking
admission, plenary power dictated the outcome by rendering
decisions pertaining to the exclusion of noncitizens largely
immune from judicial review. Because the court simply
extended the reasoning of Plasencia, a due process case
involving a returning permanent resident, to hold that there
was no constitutional right to habeas, it never engaged in an
extraterritoriality analysis under Boumediene’s functional
approach.483 Thus, the Third Circuit applied the plenary power
as a trump card, at least in the case of noncitizens categorized
by the court as seeking initial admission and having no
substantial connection to the United States.
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Thuraissigiam, on the other
hand, began with Boumediene’s approach to analyzing habeas
cases and focused on the history of the writ.484 In rejecting the
Third Circuit’s reliance on Plasencia, the court stressed that
habeas and due process are distinct constitutional provisions
with different historical origins and should not be conflated.485
The court also rejected the government’s reliance on Mezei,
reasoning that Mezei was treated as someone standing at the
border only for due process purposes, and that Mezei “otherwise
affirmed the principle that habeas is available even when a
petitioner lacks due process rights.”486 The court concluded that
482. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 439–50 (explaining and applying the plenary
power doctrine).
483. See id. at 445 (“The reason Petitioner’s Suspension Clause claim fails
at step one is because the Supreme Court has unequivocally concluded that
‘an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege
and has no constitutional rights regarding his application.’” (citing Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982))).
484. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097,
1104–08 (9th Cir. 2018) (beginning Suspension Clause analysis with
discussion of history of the writ and Boumediene).
485. Id. at 1111–12 (citing Lee Kovarsky, Custodial and Collateral
Process: A Response to Professor Garrett, 98 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1
(2013); Mary Van Houten, The Post-Boumediene Paradox: Habeas Corpus or
Due Process?, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 10 (2014); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. &
Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the
War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2037 (2007)).
486. Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1115 (citing Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953)).
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“[p]lenary power concerns cannot in all circumstances
overwhelm the ‘fundamental procedural protections of habeas
corpus . . . a right of first importance.’”487 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the application of plenary power as some type
of trump card and even suggested that the Great Writ may
trump the plenary power.
Given that several plenary power cases, including Knauff
and Mezei, recognized a right to habeas, even though they
refused to extend due process rights, it may be that with respect
to this particular right at least, the Ninth Circuit has a point.488
However, it is not clear that the Ninth Circuit would have
reached a different conclusion in analyzing the relationship
between due process and plenary power, despite the distinctions
it drew between due process and habeas, since the court rejected
the notion that the petitioner “lack[ed] all procedural due
process rights.”489 Nor is it clear that one doctrine must “trump”
another to resolve conflicts in their interaction. As explained
below, there are other ways to understand their relationship.
2. Plenary Power as an Implicit Deference Doctrine
Another way the plenary power can influence courts is as
an implicit deference doctrine. As explained in Part III, the
plenary power has its roots in norms of deference to the political
branches.490 Ernesto Hernández-López has argued that the
plenary power can act as a “fallback doctrine” even in cases that
do not involve immigration law, resulting in the denial of

487. Id. at 1119 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008)).
488. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)
(stating that the petitioner was “doubtless[ly]” entitled to habeas corpus even
though the 1891 Immigration Act prevented review of immigration decisions);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543–44 (1950)
(reviewing Knauff’s habeas petition despite concluding that the Due Process
Clause did not apply); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 213 (1953) (recognizing that Mezei “may by habeas corpus challenge the
validity of his exclusion”).
489. Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1111 n.15.
490. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 154–59 (2002)
(describing Supreme Court plenary power decisions).
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remedies.491 He contends that judicial decisions allowing the
indefinite detention of Uighurs in Guantánamo are ostensibly
about habeas release, but actually reflect “traditional plenary
power norms” of “deferring to the [E]xecutive and limiting alien
rights.”492
Similarly, the plenary power functions as an implicit
deference doctrine in the cross-border shooting cases, which do
not involve immigration law but do involve noncitizens located
outside the United States. Although the context is totally
different from Uighurs in Guantánamo, the rejection of judicial
remedies based on norms of deference to the political branches
is the same. In refusing to extend a Bivens remedy, the Fifth
Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Hernández II
introduced traditional plenary power norms through their
analyses of whether the case presented a “new context” and
involved “special factors.”
In concluding that “special factors” existed, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that extending Bivens threatened the political
branches’ supervision of national security and risked interfering
with foreign affairs and diplomacy more generally.493 Since the
Executive Branch had refused to indict Mesa and denied his
extradition to Mexico, the court noted that it could undermine
the validity of the Executive Branch’s prior determinations if a
federal court entered a damages judgment against Mesa.494
The Supreme Court’s decision affirming the Fifth Circuit
applied norms of deference to both parts of the Bivens analysis.
The Court found that a cross-border shooting presents a “new
context” because it involves a significant risk of “‘disruptive
intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other
branches.’”495 Along the same lines, the Court reasoned that
special factors existed because the expansion of Bivens would
impinge on foreign relations, an area entrusted to the political

491. Ernesto Hernández-López, Kiyemba, Guantánamo and Immigration
Law: An Extraterritorial Constitution in a Plenary Power World, 2 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 193, 194–95, 204–05 (2012).
492. Id. at 224.
493. Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 818–19 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
494. See id. at 820 (pointing to prior diplomacy between the United States
and Mexican governments).
495. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 734, 744 (2020) (quoting Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017)).
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branches and largely immune from judicial review.496
Additionally, the Court identified border security and
Congress’s decision not to allow damages suits in other contexts
as other special factors, concluding that all of these factors boil
down to a concern for respecting separation of powers.497
Although the Court never explicitly mentioned the plenary
power doctrine, it set the tone by quoting Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy,498 a key case in the development of that
doctrine.499 In fact, Harisiades provides an extreme example of
the operation of the plenary power doctrine, as it affirmed the
deportation of permanent residents based solely on former
membership in the Communist party, reasoning that it would
be “rash and irresponsible . . . to qualify the Government’s power
of deportation.”500
By contrast, the dissenting opinions at the Fifth Circuit and
Supreme Court, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Rodriguez, framed the case as an ordinary incident of excessive
force by an officer, rejecting the relevance of deferential norms.
Judge Prado’s dissent at the Fifth Circuit argued that the
majority had been “led astray from the familiar circumstances
of this case by empty labels of national security, foreign affairs,
and extraterritoriality.”501 He noted that the same concerns
raised by the majority about foreign affairs and diplomacy exist
when a noncitizen is injured within the United States.502
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez viewed the
case as an ordinary law enforcement issue involving the
unprovoked use of lethal force.503
496. Id. at 744–50.
497. Id. at 749–50.
498. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
499. See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 744 (quoting Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 589,
which states that matters relating “to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are
so exclusively trusted to the political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial review); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 558–60 (1990) (explaining the role of
Harisiades in the plenary power doctrine).
500. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591.
501. Hernández II, 885 F.3d at 825 (Prado, J., dissenting).
502. Id. at 829.
503. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 745 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Hernández II followed
Rodriguez in framing the issue as “the rogue actions of a
rank-and-file law enforcement officer,” rather than a matter
related to foreign policy and national security.504 She pointed
out that courts routinely address numerous border-related
issues concurrently with whatever diplomacy may be
happening, and that in this particular case, Mexico supported
judicial intervention.505 Far from considering the situation one
immune from judicial review, Justice Ginsburg stressed the
need for a judicial remedy.506
Hernández II provides an example of how plenary power
norms can creep into a case that has nothing to do with
immigration law in contexts involving noncitizens, especially
when they are outside the country. The influence of plenary
power as an implicit deference doctrine creates a risk of unfairly
limiting rights and remedies in situations where deference to
the political branches is not actually required and where the
only possible redress may come from the judiciary. The more
severe the constitutional violations involved, the more risky it
is for courts to implicitly invoke plenary power norms.
3. Plenary Power as Subject to Legislative and Constitutional
Constraints
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the plenary
power is subject to legislative and constitutional constraints.507
Thus, a third approach is to construe the plenary power as
limited by the INA, another relevant statute, or the
Constitution, thereby avoiding conflicting interpretations that
arise from application of the plenary power and
extraterritoriality doctrines.
The district court followed this approach in Al Otro Lado.
There, the government had argued that the plenary power was
504. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
505. Id. at 758.
506. Id. at 760.
507. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2415 (2018) (upholding
the President’s Proclamation as “squarely within the scope of the President’s
authority under the INA”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713
(1893) (“The power to exclude or to expel aliens . . . is vested in the political
departments of the government . . . except so far the judicial department has
been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount law
of the constitution, to intervene.” (emphasis added)).

EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS

837

a trump card that defeated the extraterritorial plaintiffs’ due
process claim.508 The government also relied on plenary power
as an implicit deference doctrine in claiming that the case
involved a nonjusticiable political question, because managing
“the flow of travel across the border” implicated foreign
affairs.509 In rejecting both of these arguments, the district court
reasoned that it was not ruling on the wisdom of discretionary
immigration or foreign policy decisions, but rather had to
determine whether the “metering” policy was consistent with
the INA.510 Accordingly, the court stressed the legislative
constraints on plenary power, explaining that “[f]ederal courts
have the power to ‘review the political branches’ action to
determine whether they exceed the constitutional or statutory
scope of their authority.’”511 Because the court had found that
plaintiffs’ statutory challenges to “metering” survived the
government’s motion to dismiss, and due process extended at
least as far as the INA’s statutory protections for asylum
seekers, it rejected the plenary power arguments.512
Similarly, the Third Circuit’s decision in Osorio-Martinez,
which involved some of the same child petitioners from Castro
after they obtained Special Immigrant Juvenile Status,
emphasized the numerous procedural protections established by
Congress for individuals with this status.513 The court then
concluded that “[i]n these circumstances, the plenary power of
the political departments does not preclude invocation of the

508. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Partially
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 11–12, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v.
McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 3:17-cv-02366-BASKSC).
509. See id. at 28 (citing Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588 – 89, and referencing
the plenary power cases previously cited).
510. See Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1192 (S.D.
Cal. 2019) (“We must decide only whether Executive Order No. 12807, which
reflects and implements those [immigration policy] choices, is consistent with
§ 243(h) of the INA.” (citations omitted)).
511. Id. at 1191–92 (quoting E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909
F.3d 1219, 1232 (9th Cir. 2018)).
512. See id. at 1193 (rejecting political question doctrine challenge).
513. See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 176
(3d Cir. 2018) (“As SIJ designees, Petitioners have . . . been accorded an array
of significant statutory rights and procedural protections by Congress . . . .”).
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Suspension Clause.”514 Indeed, the court went even further,
stating, “if anything, [the plenary power] cuts the other way,”
since
“[i]nsulating
expedited
orders
from
judicial
review . . . hardly accords respect to Congress’s wide-ranging
authority in the immigration realm.”515 In other words, because
Congress had “marshaled” the plenary power to protect children
with Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, not to deprive them of
procedural protections, the court’s job was to enforce the rights
granted by Congress.516
While these decisions turned on the legislative constraints
on the plenary power, the Supreme Court has also long
recognized that this power is subject to certain constitutional
constraints.517 Accordingly, in an amicus brief to the Supreme
Court in Thuraissigiam, legal scholars argued “[t]he Suspension
Clause and its guarantee of access to the writ of habeas corpus
is just such a constitutional limitation on the Congress’s plenary
power.”518
This type of argument may be more complicated in cases in
which the proposed constitutional limitation is due process,
since the plenary power cases explicitly address due process
rights. Nevertheless, the Court has recognized due process
constraints on the plenary power in certain situations, and one
could argue that the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence
imposes further constitutional constraints on that power. For
example, if the statutory challenges to the “Remain in Mexico”
policy ultimately fail, one could argue that the plenary power

514. Id.
515. Id. (emphasis added).
516. See id. at 176–77 (noting that Petitioners were only seeking to
“enforce the very rights and [judicial] review that Congress did grant”).
517. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (stating that the
plenary power is “subject to important constitutional limitations”); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983) (explaining that it is the province of the
courts to decide “whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible
means of implementing [the plenary] power”); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (stating that Congress’s plenary power over
immigration is limited “by the Constitution itself”); Hernández v. Sessions,
872 F.3d 976, 990 n.17 (9th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that “the Due Process
Clause stands as a significant constraint on the manner in which the political
branches may exercise their authority” (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695)).
518. Brief for Scholars of the Law of Habeas Corpus as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, ___
U.S. ___, 2020 WL 402705 at *13 (Jan. 22, 2020).
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does not preclude plaintiffs in Mexico from invoking due process
protections because extraterritorial cases like Verdugo and
Boumediene constitutionally constrain its application.519
It is critical for courts to consider these legislative and
constitutional constraints on the plenary power carefully, and
to construe them broadly, in order to preserve the judicial
review necessary to check executive authority, protect basic
rights, and prevent the creation of a lawless border region where
constitutional constraints do not apply.
C. Separation of Powers and the Anti-Manipulation Principle
The cases in Part IV also raise important questions about
the application of Boumediene’s arguments for protecting
separation of powers in the border enforcement context. In
Boumediene, the Court wanted to ensure that the political
branches could not “switch the Constitution on or off at will,”
which would “permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system
of government.”520 This means that the Judicial Branch must be
able to define the limits of the political branches’ power.521 The
Court was particularly concerned about the political branches
being able to manipulate jurisdiction in order to evade judicial
review.522 The Court refused to allow the political branches to
manipulate geography, by acquiring or disposing of territory, in
a way that would allow “Congress and the President, not this
Court, to say ‘what the law is.’”523 This concern over
manipulation was not unfounded, as the Court had heard about
519. See, e.g., Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 506 (9th
Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (challenging DHS’s “Remain in Mexico” policy under 8
U.S.C. § 1225 (2018)).
520. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).
521. See
Martin
J.
Katz,
Guantanamo,
Boumediene,
and
Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25
CONST. COMMENT. 377, 396–97 (2009) (breaking down Boumediene’s
separation of powers argument into three principles: an external limit
principle, judicial enforcement principle, and anti-manipulation principle).
522. Id. at 378, 397 n.89 (arguing that Boumediene is a case about
separation of powers and distinguishing Boumediene’s anti-manipulation
principle and its focus on evading judicial review from concerns about
manipulating jurisdiction to favor or disfavor particular rights).
523. Boumediene, 522 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 177 (1803)).
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“legal strategies designed by the Executive to evade the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts and constraints of law.”524 The Court
therefore developed a test for determining the scope of a
constitutional right that would “not be subject to manipulation
by those whose power it is designed to restrain.”525 Some
commentators have argued that Boumediene’s separation of
powers
analysis,
especially
its
ground-breaking
anti-manipulation principle, is one the most critical
contributions of the case.526
Boumediene’s forceful arguments for judicial review are
useful in construing the relationship between extraterritoriality
analysis and plenary power. The same concerns about
preventing the political branches from having unlimited power,
and preserving the judiciary’s role in providing oversight, weigh
in favor of constraining the plenary power and allowing courts
to exercise some level of judicial review, especially when it
comes to constitutional claims. Otherwise, reflexively deferring
to the political branches’ plenary power over immigration allows
them to determine (and manipulate) the scope of the
Constitution’s limits on their own power.
As explained below, the Constitution’s textual ambiguity
regarding its extraterritorial reach underscores the need for
structural principles, such as separation of powers, to act as a
check on the political branches and prevent their manipulation
of constitutional rights. Specifically, the border enforcement
cases reflect concern for at least two types of manipulation:
manipulation of the border as a legal construct, and

524. Azmy, supra note 460, at 468.
525. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 727. But see Lobel, supra note 8, at 1651
(arguing that Boumediene’s “functional test is disconnected from the
separation of powers discussion that preceded its articulation, and it virtually
ignores the separation-of-powers concerns that were central to the Court’s
analysis of the Suspension Clause”).
526. See Azmy, supra note 460, at 466–72 (unpacking Boumediene’s
“anti-manipulation principle”); Katz, supra note 521, at 396–97, 399 (distilling
three principles of separation of powers from Boumediene); Stephen I.
Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of
Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2111 (2009) (stating that Boumediene
“appears to be as much about preserving the role of the courts as it is about
protecting the individual rights of litigants”); Marc D. Falkoff & Robert
Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
851, 879 (2010) (observing that Boumediene’s “approach emphasized not
rights, but limitations”).
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manipulation of national security as an illusory threat, both of
which are discussed below.
1. Textual Ambiguity and the Need for Structural Checks
One of the reasons that structural principles, such as
separation of powers, are particularly important in analyzing
the extraterritorial reach of constitutional rights is because the
Constitution’s text leaves many questions of extraterritoriality
unresolved.527 Certain rights, such as those in Article IV’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause, explicitly apply only to
citizens who reside within state territories.528 Some scholars
have also interpreted the Supremacy Clause, which refers to the
“supreme Law of the Land,”529 and the Preamble, which begins,
“We the People of the United States,”530 to limit the
Constitution’s protections to individuals physically present in
the country.531 However, others have observed that “most of the
Constitution’s provisions are not textually restricted by either
population or geography. Instead, they define the general

527. See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
515, 530–32, 593–94 (2009) (“The Framers of the Constitution did not speak
very clearly at all with regard to the relationship between territory and
constitutional scope.”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:
Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary
Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17 (2002) (“Questions about the
geographic and popular scope of the Constitution were . . . not readily resolved
by the Constitution’s text); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as
Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 11, 23–24 (1985) (noting that no court since Reid “has suggested that any
constitutional provision is inapplicable because the challenged conduct
occurred in a foreign country”); J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case
Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 481 (2007) (criticizing
“globalist” interpretations of the Constitution’s silence about scope); Kal
Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2517–20
(2005) (discussing history of “legal spatiality” in the United States
Constitution).
528. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”);
see also id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or [shall any state] deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
529. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
530. Id. pmbl.
531. See Kent, supra note 527, at 466 (analyzing the text and history of
the Constitution in regards to extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights).
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powers of the national government or impose general limits on
the exercise of those powers.”532
This textual ambiguity permeates the cross-border cases
discussed above, appearing as inconsistent interpretation or
simply avoidance of the constitutional text. In Verdugo, Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion specifically contrasted the words “the
people” in the Fourth Amendment, which he interpreted as
limiting its reach to the people of the United States, with the
language of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which
respectively refer to “no person” and “the accused.”533 One would
think, then, that in cases involving Fifth Amendment claims,
like Hernández, the language of the Due Process Clause would
weigh in favor of extending the right extraterritorially.534
However, the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decisions in Hernández I
and Hernández II never addressed the text of the Due Process
Clause.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision to avoid addressing the relevant
Constitutional text during rehearing en banc is especially
interesting given that Judge Prado’s initial decision in
Hernández, prior to rehearing en banc, provided a thoughtful
textual analysis of the Fifth Amendment.535 Judge Prado
specifically contrasted the unqualified language of the Due
Process Clause with Constitutional provisions that explicitly
impose territorial constraints,536 such as the Thirteenth
Amendment, which states that “Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.”537 For further support, Judge
Prado cited the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cannatella,538 which
found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applied to “excludable aliens” because “excludable

532. Cleveland, supra note 527, at 19.
533. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264–65 (1990).
534. See Hernández v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 267 (5th Cir. 2014)
(discussing the appellant’s Fifth Amendment claim).
535. See id. at 267–72 (looking to the text of the Fifth Amendment to
determine the Amendment’s extraterritorial application).
536. See id. at 262 (“Not all constitutional provisions will have equal
extraterritorial application, if any. Some contain geographical references, but
others do not.”).
537. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1).
538. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987).
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aliens are not non-persons.”539 The textual difference between
the Fifth and Fourth Amendments alone led Judge Prado to
conclude that Verdugo’s sufficient connections test did not apply
to the Fifth Amendment claim.540 Nevertheless, the Fifth
Circuit did not address the text of the Due Process Clause
during rehearing en banc.
The Suspension Clause cases provide another interesting
example where consideration of the constitutional text has been
selective. In both Boumediene and I.N.S v. St. Cyr,541 the
dissents authored by Justice Scalia argued that the text of the
Suspension Clause did not support the Court’s conclusion that
it applied to the noncitizens in those cases.542 In St. Cyr, Justice
Scalia’s dissent stressed that the Suspension Clause “does not
guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of
habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not
(except in cases of rebellion or invasion) be suspended.”543 In
Boumediene, Justice Scalia’s dissent relied on the same
interpretation of the Suspension Clause as in St. Cyr.544
Yet Judge Rogers’s dissent in the lower court’s decision in
Boumediene, which reached the opposite conclusion from
Justice Scalia, also relied on the Suspension Clause’s text.545
Specifically, Judge Rogers argued that the Suspension Clause
“makes no reference to citizens or even to persons” and is

539. Hernández, 757 F.3d at 268 (citing Cannatella, 810 F.2d at 1374–75
(emphasis added)).
540. See id. at 268 (“The significantly different language leads us to the
conclusion that [the] sufficient connections test . . . does not apply in
interpreting the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment.”).
541. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
542. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 849 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“I conclude that the text and history of the Suspension Clause
provide no basis for our jurisdiction . . . .”); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 337 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the Suspension Clause did not apply to the
petitioner there).
543. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 337.
544. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 843–50 (analyzing the text and history
of the Suspension Clause).
545. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 995–96 (2007) (Rogers, J.,
dissenting) (looking to the text of the Suspension Clause to reject the
contention that the Clause could not be invoked), overruled by Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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included in Article I, which sets limits on Congress’s powers.546
Judge Rogers contrasted the unqualified language of the
Suspension Clause with the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments, which respectively refer to “people,” “person,” and
“the accused.”547 He also noted that the provision immediately
following the Suspension Clause in Article I, Section 9, which
provides that “no Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed,”548 similarly uses unqualified language in setting limits
on government power.549
These textual ambiguities render broader structural
principles, such as separation of powers, all the more important
in determining the extraterritorial scope of constitutional
protections.550 As Timothy Zick argues, ways to “narrow some of
the Constitution’s internal gaps” include “more careful attention
to and application of the Constitution’s spatial structure.”551
Boumediene did just that by stressing that the Executive
Branch’s manipulation of territory could disrupt separation of
powers, allowing the “political branches to govern without legal
constraint.”552 As explained below, the border enforcement cases
reflect apprehension about the Executive Branch’s ability to
manipulate constitutional rights in at least two ways: by
manipulating the border as a legal construct, and by
manipulating national security concerns.

546. Id.
547. See id. at 996 (referring to the “plain text” of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments to conclude that they “confer rights to the persons listed”).
548. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
549. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 996–97 (noting that “the ban on ex post
facto legislation” restricts government power by “confin[ing] the legislature to
penal decisions with prospective effect”).
550. See Zick, supra note 527, at 532, 606 (arguing that “broader structural
principles and constitutional values have increasingly been relied upon to
resolve textual uncertainties with regard to domain and to settle jurisdictional
conflicts”).
551. Id. at 601; see also id. at 602 (“Insofar as territorial displacements
affect . . . collective interests, we ought to look to the Constitution’s structural
principles for political and judicial remedies.”).
552. Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 765.
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2. Manipulation of the Border as Legal Construct
Historically, legal manipulation of the border has deprived
noncitizens of basic rights and protections.553 Although the
physical border between the United States and Mexico may not
change, the government has long manipulated the border as a
legal construct, moving its functional location inwards or
outwards in ways that affect legal protections and benefits.554
The “entry fiction” doctrine in immigration law reflects this
type of manipulation by treating noncitizens already inside the
United States as if they were outside seeking entry.555 As Ayelet
Shachar has explained, the Executive Branch manipulates the
legal border both by moving it inward with policies such as
expedited removal that extend into the interior, and by moving
it outwards through pre-inspections in foreign countries, safe

553. Cf. Zick, supra note 527, at 517 (arguing that “governmental control
over and manipulation of place, geography, and territory can be very
dangerous to individual liberty”).
554. See Cecilia Menjívar, Immigration Law Beyond Borders:
Externalizing and Internalizing Border Controls in an Era of Securitization,
10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 353, 354 (2014) (discussing “the expansion of
borders beyond the physical demarcation between two nations”); Lori A.
Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2009) (explaining how the United States, Europe, and
other nations are “moving the locus of border enforcement efforts beyond their
own terrestrial borders and floating such borders into the sea or landing them
on territories of foreign countries, in order to halt the flow of refugees”); Huyen
Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115 (2008) (arguing
that federal, state, and local laws denying access to multiple essential benefits
based on immigration status effectively deny the ability to live in the United
States); Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3
STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 165, 167 (2007) (describing the border as “a
moving barrier, a legal construct that is not tightly fixed to territorial
benchmarks”); Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the
Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 403 (2007) (noting the
“malleability” of the border); Zick, supra note 527, at 601 (“[T]he legal mapping
of geographic borders can be determinative of access to fundamental liberties
like due process and equality.”); Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic
Borders: A Necessary Step Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 203, 205 (2002) (arguing that the processes for implementing
immigration policies create barriers of their own, distorting substantive
immigration laws).
555. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213
(1953) (“For purposes of the immigration laws . . . the legal incidents of an
alien’s entry remain unaltered whether he has been here once before or not.”).
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third country agreements, and other measures.556 The Third
Circuit’s decision in Castro builds on this type of manipulation
by treating noncitizens apprehended after entering the United
States and placed in expedited removal proceedings as if they
were seeking admission at the border.557
The recent expansion of expedited removal to individuals
apprehended anywhere in the United States within two years of
entry amplifies the extraordinary nature of Castro’s reasoning.
If extended to this new context, Castro’s application of the entry
fiction doctrine to expedited removal cases would have startling
effects. It would mean that even someone who has lived in the
United States for up to two years and is apprehended in the
middle of the country would be treated as if seeking admission
at the border and, under Castro, lack any constitutional
rights.558 Huyen Pham has argued that federal, state, and local
laws denying a multitude of benefits to undocumented
immigrants communicate symbolic messages of prejudice, foster
racial and ethnic profiling, and “create permanent borders of
discrimination” that harm all those who “look or sound foreign,”
regardless of immigration status.559 Like those “moving border
laws,” the proposed expansion of expedited removal policy
manipulates the border in a way that sends a clear message of
long-term exclusion from social membership.
In the cross-border shooting cases, the manipulation is in
arguing that constitutional rights designed to deter certain
conduct cease to apply simply because a bullet happens to land
on one side of the border instead of the other.560 This appears
556. See Shachar, supra note 554, at 172–81 (discussing the different ways
in which the Executive Branch uses enforcement tactics to expand the legal
border).
557. See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 445 (3d Cir.
2016) (finding the individuals “apprehended within hours of surreptitiously
entering the United States” to be “alien[s] seeking initial admission to the
United States”).
558. However, given that Castro and Osorio-Martinez also discussed ties
to the United States, it is unclear whether the Third Circuit would follow the
same approach in a case arising under the expanded expedited removal policy
that involves someone with strong ties to the country.
559. See Pham, supra note 554, at 1122, 1163.
560. See Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 756–57 (2020) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that it makes little sense for a remedy designed to deter
certain conduct “to turn on a happenstance subsequent to the conduct—a
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especially manipulative given the “near irrelevance of [the]
midculvert line . . . for most border-related purposes.”561
Allowing such arbitrary distinctions to result in the denial of
constitutional claims reinforces prejudicial views that some
lives are more valuable than others.
In the metering case, Al Otro Lado, the district court was
also concerned about an arbitrary distinction in rejecting the
government’s argument that asylum seekers stopped on the
international bridge could not avail themselves of due process
protections because they were not technically in the United
States.562 The court realized that distinguishing asylum seekers
who had made it to a port of entry from those stopped some feet
away on an international bridge would make both the statutory
and constitutional protections for asylum seekers vulnerable to
manipulation by the Executive Branch.563 Thus, the court
stressed that “[t]he lesson of Boumediene is that the political
branches do not enjoy the prerogative to ‘switch the
Constitution on or off at will.’”564
The “Remain in Mexico” policy poses an even more extreme
example of manipulation of the legal border than “metering.” By
moving asylum seekers who are in United States removal
proceedings to Mexico, it separates their physical location from
the location of their legal process. This prevents them from
establishing any type of communal or political membership in
the United States, while also limiting their movement abroad,
since they must stay close to the border for their court hearings.
Instead of extending access to justice through the asylum
process, it perpetuates the injustice of exclusion and

bullet landing in one half of a culvert, not the other”); Rodriguez v. Swartz,
899 F.3d 719, 748 (9th Cir. 2018) (reasoning that it would be wrong to preclude
the claim simply because an injury “happened a few feet into the other side of
the border”).
561. Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2010–11 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
562. Al Otro Lado, Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 55, at 76.
563. See id. (concluding that the “New Individual Plaintiffs” stated
procedural due process claims).
564. Id.
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segregation.565 If left unchecked, such extreme manipulation of
the border as a legal construct could result in a law-free zone
where human rights are routinely violated with no judicial
review.
3. Manipulation of National Security as an Illusory Threat
The second manipulation concern that emerges from the
border enforcement cases is manipulation of national security
as an illusory threat to urge deference to the political branches.
The anti-manipulation principle may be hardest to implement
in cases implicating national security and foreign affairs, where
the executive power is at its peak and the judiciary is the most
constrained.566 But that is also precisely when the principle is
most needed to protect against abuse of power. Indeed,
Boumediene applied it in a case involving “enemy combatants”
during the “war on terror.”567 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,568 another
war-on-terror case, the Court observed that, even in times of
conflict, the Constitution “most assuredly envisions a role for all
three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”569
Additionally, the Court has cautioned against rote reliance on
national security as “a talisman used to ward off inconvenient

565. Cf. Zick, supra note 527, at 602 (arguing that “(re-)spatialization of
justice and liberty . . . will require, at a minimum, a more robust judicial rule
in setting limits on immigration policy and enforcement”).
566. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (“Matters intimately
related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for
judicial intervention.”); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018)
(stating that “the political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility
and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns”); see also Doe v.
Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has never
implied a Bivens remedy in a case involving the military, national security, or
intelligence.”); Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 207–09 (3d Cir.
2017) (concluding that special factors weighed against implying a Bivens
action as the TSA is “tasked with assisting in a critical aspect of national
security,” and “[t]he threat of damages liability could . . . increase the
probability that a TSA agent would hesitate in making split-second
decisions”).
567. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008) (stating that “the
test for determining the scope of this provision must not be subject to
manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain”).
568. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
569. Id. at 536.
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claims—a ‘label’ used to ‘cover a multitude of sins.’”570 However,
the Court has been reluctant to take as strong a stand in cases
implicating national security that involve constitutional tort
claims for damages.571
Since the 9/11 attacks, the conflation of border enforcement
and national security has been greatly amplified, producing the
term “border security” and fusing concerns about immigration
and terrorism.572 Consequently, one of the most critical
questions in analyzing these issues is whether a case actually
implicates national security, or if one party is manipulating
national security concerns in order to avoid judicial review,
receive deference, or escape a remedy. The cross-border shooting
cases exemplify different responses to this question.
In Hernández II, the Fifth Circuit found that national
security was implicated simply because the events took place at
the border. The court was vexed about Border Patrol agents’
ability to make “split second decisions,” analogizing to a Third
Circuit case involving a TSA agent, even though TSA agents are
not law enforcement officers trained on constitutional
570. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017) (quoting Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523 (1985)).
571. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009) (finding the plaintiff’s
claim for damages deficient in several respects); see also George D. Brown,
Accountability, Liability, and the War on Terror—Constitutional Tort Suits as
Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 FLA. L. REV. 193, 242–48 (2011)
(discussing the role of national security deference in creating challenges to
bringing tort suits); George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter Terrorism via
Lawsuit”—The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 895–900 (2009)
(discussing differences between damages suits and habeas petitions); Andrew
Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1123, 1125 (2014) (collecting appellate court cases dismissing Bivens
claims because special factors counsel against extraterritorial Bivens actions
related to national security); Peter S. Margulies, Curbing Remedies for Official
Wrongs: The Need for Bivens Suits in National Security Cases, 68 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1153, 1175 (2018) (noting the effects of “the Supreme Court’s 2010
decision limiting remedies in Iqbal”).
572. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration
Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827,
1853 (2007) (explaining that the term “national security” is “deployed in a
nebulous manner” in the immigration debate); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard
Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and the
Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1396–1404
(2007) (arguing that the “war on terror” transformed the discussion of border
enforcement into a national security issue).
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doctrines.573 Judge Prado’s dissent, on the other hand, found
that the case had “nothing to do with terrorism” and did not
significantly implicate border security.574 In his view, the case
“more closely resemble[d] ordinary civil litigation against a
federal agent than a case involving a true inquiry into sensitive
national security and military affairs, which are properly
committed to the Executive Branch.”575
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hernández II affirmed the
Fifth Circuit, finding national security concerns based on the
Border Patrol’s general responsibility to “protect the illegal
entry of dangerous persons and goods.”576 Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent, however, could “not grasp how allowing a Bivens action
here would intrude on the political branches’ national-security
prerogatives,” given the instructions Border Patrol agents
receive prohibiting the unjustified use of deadly force.577 Both
Ginsburg’s dissent in Hernández II and Rodriguez quoted
Abbasi’s warning that national security concerns must not
become a talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims—a label
used to “cover a multitude of sins.”578
Other uses of force against migrants, such as the incidents
involving cross-border spraying of tear gas described in Part II,
have also been justified by national security concerns. As the
caravan of migrants that was eventually tear gassed headed
north towards the border, President’s Trump described it as a
would-be “invasion” by “bad people,” “terrorists,” and “Middle

573. See Hernández II, 885 F.3d 811, 819 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(rejecting the implication of “a private right of action for damages in the
transnational context” (citing Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189 (3d
Cir. 2017))); see also id. at 828–29 (Prado, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority’s reliance on Vanderklok was misplaced because TSA agents typically
are not trained on constitutional doctrines that govern law enforcement
officers, whereas Border Patrol Agent Mesa was trained on the reasonable use
of force).
574. See id. at 827–28 (Prado, J., dissenting) (identifying the contradiction
in the majority’s argument that any incident taking place at the border
implicates border security).
575. Id. at 829.
576. Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 746 (2020).
577. Id. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
578. Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017) (citations omitted); see
Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 758; Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 745–46 (9th
Cir. 2018).
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Easterners.”579 He then used this purported threat to deploy
thousands of troops to the border, authorizing them to use lethal
force if necessary.580 Human Rights First and other
organizations argued that the Trump Administration had
“cultivated this alleged crisis.”581
Despite the Trump Administration’s rhetoric describing
migrants as criminals and gang members who “prey on our
citizens,”582 the government’s own data indicate that less than
three percent of individuals apprehended by Border Patrol are
criminals or gang members.583 Furthermore, apprehensions
along the Southern border are at “record low levels,”584 having
dropped from over a million a year decades ago to around
300,000.585 Recidivism rates—the percentage of individuals
apprehended by Border Patrol more than once within a fiscal
year—have similarly dropped over the past five years.586

579. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, REFUGEE BLOCKAGE: THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION’S OBSTRUCTION OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AT THE BORDER 1 (2018),
https://perma.cc/NRW4-AU5Z (PDF).
580. Id.
581. Id.
582. See Philip Bump, Here’s Everything Donald Trump Said About
Immigration in His Speech to Congress, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2017 12:23 PM),
https://perma.cc/LNT6-5QF9 (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (recounting President
Trump’s statement that he is “removing gang members, drug dealers and
criminals that threaten our communities and prey on our citizens”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
583. CBP Enforcement Statistics FY 2019, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, https://perma.cc/7VKH-N75X (last visited Apr. 8, 2020) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Of the 310,531 individuals that
Border Patrol apprehended nationwide in FY 2017, only 8,531 (2.7%) had
criminal convictions. Id. In the first part of FY 2018, October 1, 2017 to June
30, 2018, only 1.9% of all apprehensions by Border Patrol were convicted
criminals. Id. The number of gang members apprehended is even smaller, just
536 people in FY 2017 (0.0017% of all apprehensions). Id.
584. Id.
585. See Southwest Border Migration FY 2019, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, https://perma.cc/DWK6-3MCA (last visited Apr. 8, 2020)
(summarizing and documenting total apprehensions along the Southern
border for FY 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
586. See CBP Enforcement Statistics FY 2019, supra note 583
(summarizing instances in which CBP apprehended individuals who had been
apprehended previously).
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In short, not only do Border Patrol agents exercise
significant authority with minimal review of their actions,587 but
the President has encouraged abusive practices by falsely
portraying ordinary migrants as a national security threat and
militarizing border operations. Since Bivens aims to deter
unconstitutional conduct in situations “where official action is
unconstrained,”588 there are good reasons to extend it to
situations involving Border Patrol officers who use excessive
force, especially when that force is lethal.
In the expedited removal cases, which involve the right to
habeas, not a Bivens remedy, the Third and Ninth Circuits did
not discuss national security concerns, although the Ninth
Circuit did note that the Suspension Clause protects the right
to habeas “even in circumstances—such as national security, in
Boumediene—where the executive’s power is at its zenith.”589
Both Castro and Thuraissigiam involved asylum seekers who
had negative credible fear determinations, which represents the
situation of many noncitizens subjected to expedited removal.590
There is no reason to think individuals in this situation
represent a threat to national security.591 Yet, the DHS’s notice
announcing an expansion of expedited removal raises the
specter of national security as a justification. In explaining why

587. See Alexandra A. Botsaris, Note, Hernández v. Mesa: Preserving the
Zone of Constitutional Uncertainty at the Border, 77 MD. L. REV. 832, 848–50
(2018) (explaining that CBP agents have more authority than traditional law
enforcement officers and receive inadequate training and screening).
588. Bernard W. Bell, Reexamining Bivens after Ziglar v. Abbasi, 9
CONLAWNOW 77, 85 (2018).
589. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 917 F.3d 1097,
1108 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 797–98 (2008)).
590. See, e.g., Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 835 F.3d 422, 428
(3d Cir. 2016) (recounting that the asylum seeker received a “negative credible
fear” determination); Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1101 (same).
591. See Vanessa M. Garza, Comment, Unheard and Deported: The
Unconstitutional Denial of Habeas Corpus in Expedited Removal, 56 HOUSTON
L. REV. 881, 923 (2019) (stating that immigrants from Mexico and Central
America often are victims of violence and do not engage in terrorist activities
against the United States and calling the national security argument
“misleading political rhetoric”); see also Alvaro Peralta, Note, Bordering
Persecution: Why Asylum Seekers Should Not be Subject to Expedited Removal,
64 AM. U. L. REV. 1303, 1311–13 (2015) (arguing that expedited removal
imposes procedural hurdles that result in the denial of meritorious asylum
claims).
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the expanded policy was issued without any advance notice or
an opportunity for public comment, the DHS asserted that
“delayed implementation could lead to a surge in migration
across the southern border during a notice-and-comment
period.”592
Similarly, the DHS has invoked an illusory national
security threat in justifying both “metering” and the “Remain in
Mexico” policies. When then-Secretary of Homeland Security
Kirstjen Nielsen announced the “metering” policy, she described
it as related to the “loophole” of asylum that is “so abused,”
suggesting that asylum cases tend to be frivolous or fraudulent,
despite data showing significant grant rates.593 In January
2019, when the DHS issued a press release on the “Remain in
Mexico” policy, it claimed that this new policy would address the
“security and humanitarian crisis on the Southern border,”
“help restore a safe and orderly immigration process [and]
decrease the number of those taking advantage of the
immigration system,” and “reduce threats to life, national
security, and public safety.”594 The press release went on to
describe the activities of “smugglers, traffickers, gangs, and
criminals” that “endanger the security of the U.S.” and
concluded that the situation has “severe impacts on U.S. border
security.”595
Thus, while extraterritoriality cases related to conventional
wars or the “war on terror” involved legitimate national security
concerns, in the border enforcement context, there is a
heightened risk of the Executive Branch manipulating illusory
national security threats to urge deference to its policies,
discourage judicial review of the actions of Border Patrol agents,
and justify the denial of remedies. It is therefore essential for
courts to closely and critically examine whether the policy or
action at issue actually implicates national security.
592. 2019 Designation, supra note 13, at 35,413.
593. See Entralgo, supra note 37 (discussing the language used by the
Executive Branch in regards to the asylum system); Asylum Decision Rates,
EXECUTIVE OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., ADJUDICATION STAT., https://perma.cc
/DP6Z-E6B4 (last updated Oct. 23, 2019) (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (showing a
grant rate of 20.51% in FY 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
594. MPP Press Release, supra note 12.
595. Id.
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Finally, it is important to note that the manipulation of the
border as a legal construct and manipulation of national
security are connected. The outward and inward expansion of
the legal border has accompanied the reconceptualization of
border enforcement as a national security issue.596 Both types of
manipulation enhance government control, create new forms of
subordination, and are sustained by the criminalization of
immigrants
in
general,
including
asylum
seekers,
undocumented individuals, and those in transit who have not
even reached the United States.597
VI. Conclusion
Recent shifts in border enforcement policies threaten to
create “a dangerous band of law-free territory designed to
prevent access to United States legal protections,” including
constitutional protections.598 This threat exists even when a
significant part of the alleged constitutional violation occurs in
the United States. While both Verdugo and Boumediene offer
hope of constitutional protections that stretch beyond the
territorial border, they leave many questions unanswered.
Courts have struggled to determine whether, when, and how to
apply the “substantial connections” and “functional” tests in the
border enforcement context and beyond. After analyzing these
decisions, this Article proposes a composite test that draws on
Verdugo, Boumediene, and fundamental rights, explaining how
the factors could be applied in a broader array of cases.
One of the toughest issues that emerges from border
enforcement cases involving noncitizens outside the United
States is the interaction between the plenary power doctrine
and the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence. The decisions
discussed above are just beginning to probe the complex and
undertheorized relationship between these constitutional fields.
This Article extracts three models for thinking about that
relationship from the case law, highlighting that there is more
than one way to understand the interaction and that a court’s
approach can profoundly affect the outcome of the case. This
596. See Menjívar, supra note 554, at 354–57, 362–63 (analyzing the
evolution of the discourse on border enforcement).
597. Id.
598. Al Otro Lado, Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 379, at 25–26.
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makes it all the more important for courts to consciously address
how they are approaching the interaction, rather than allowing
the plenary power doctrine to implicitly influence their
decisions. A model that emphasizes the legislative and
constitutional constraints on plenary power would protect
against executive abuses and preserve judicial review where
fundamental rights are at stake.
The extraterritorial border enforcement cases also reinforce
the crucial role of the judiciary in protecting against the
Executive Branch’s manipulation of constitutional rights. This
Article identified two important types of manipulation of which
courts should be aware: manipulation of the border as a legal
construct and manipulation of national security as an illusory
threat. While neither form of manipulation is new, the
Executive’s manipulation of the border has taken on novel and
extreme forms, and there is an ever-widening gap between
rhetoric and reality where national security is concerned.
Separation of powers principles may be the last stand in
stopping such manipulation, requiring the judiciary to enforce
constitutional rights beyond the border.

